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 The school of thought articulated by critical theorists Giorgio Agamben and Joan 
Copjec differ from each other in methodology, approach, and language. Yet, both 
Agamben and Copjec each write to reject positivist notions of ethics, which each theorist 
identifies as rooted in the same ideological apparatuses that propagate exclusionary and 
violent actions. By turning away from pre-given ethics and ideology, these writers 
attempt to delineate why these philosophies have been the vehicle of violence and racial 
oppression, and reiterate the importance of turning away from such thought in order for 
the subject to conceptualize a new way of being and relating to others that combats 
dominant ideology. Agamben’s theoretical concept of homo sacer that lies at the center 
of his philosophical project, and Copjec’s Lacanian understanding of the subject as 
inherently ruptured, both delineate subjectivity, as well as the concepts of race and racism 
in novel ways. Using these theorists to read Morrison’s novels illustrates the critical 
concepts outlined by these two thinkers. 
 In the first chapter of this thesis, I plan to outline Agamben’s notion of homo 
sacer, and Copjec’s theorizing of the subject as inherently ruptured. I employ Morrison’s 
piece of literary criticism, Playing in the Dark: Whiteness and the Literary Imagination, 
to demonstrate how Morrison’s literary and intellectual project as a writer also aims to 
refigure subjectivity, illustrating and expanding upon Agamben and Copjec’s work. In 
the second chapter, I will move on to discuss Agamben’s political philosophy and 
concept of homo sacer, analyzing Morrison’s novels, A Mercy, and Home to demonstrate 
how her work illustrates and expands upon Agamben’s analysis of biopolitics. Lastly, in 
the third chapter of this thesis, I place Morrison in dialogue with Copjec, demonstrating 
how Morrison’s characters illustrate the notion of a ruptured subject, and why it is 
important to read her work through this lens. I aim to demonstrate how Morrison’s 
characters expand upon the notions of race, femininity, and subjectivity as conceived by 
Copjec. The ultimate goal of this thesis is to delineate why it is beneficial to place these 
three writers in dialogue with one another to analyze notions of racial identity, 
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 The school of thought articulated by critical theorists Giorgio Agamben and Joan 
Copjec differ from each other in methodology, approach, and language. Yet, both 
Agamben and Copjec each write to reject positivist notions of ethics, which each theorist 
identifies as rooted in the same ideological apparatuses that propagate exclusionary and 
violent actions. They each argue in different ways that ideology produces or perpetuates 
an oppressive social structure that induces subjects into identifying their interests within 
that system. Instead, both Agamben and Copjec propose a new way of conceiving 
subjectivity, ethics, and collectivity. By turning away from pre-given ethics and ideology, 
these writers attempt to delineate why such philosophies have been the vehicle of 
violence and racial oppression, and reiterate the importance of turning away from such 
thought in order for the subject to conceptualize a new way of being and relating to others 
that combats dominant ideology. Agamben’s theoretical concept of homo sacer that lies 
at the center of his philosophical project, and Copjec’s Lacanian understanding of the 
subject as inherently ruptured, both delineate subjectivity, as well as the concepts of race 
and racism in novel ways.   
 Using these theorists to read Morrison’s novels illustrates the critical concepts 
outlined by these two thinkers, and may also function to expand upon them, as her work 
depicts a new way of being, or a black subjectivity. Scholars have analyzed Toni 
Morrison’s work through a number of theoretical lenses, including feminism, 
psychoanalysis, and critical race theory. The central concepts of history, slavery, trauma, 
and racism in Morrison’s novels have been explicated in each of these theoretical
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 frameworks. My aim for this thesis, is to demonstrate how Morrison’s literary project 
portrays black femininity and subjectivity in a novel way, and why the study of her work 
benefits from the theoretical concepts of subjectivity laid out by Agamben and Copjec. I 
also plan to demonstrate how Agamben and Copjec’s particular concepts of subjectivity 
become illuminated and enhanced through Morrison’s novels and characters.  
 Central to Agamben’s work is the concept of homo sacer, a figure within the state 
structure that is stripped of political status and represents what Agamben defines as “bare 
life,” life that can be killed with impunity. For Agamben, the production of bare life as 
such is necessitated by the state. Morrison’s novels reflect this figure, as the African 
American characters are portrayed as what Agamben defines as homo sacer. Homo sacer 
is a figure that is submitted to the law, but is not protected by it. For Agamben, homo 
sacer represents an individual who is made to be reduced to “bare life” or biological life 
alone, a figure denied political and symbolic signification. Agamben writes that homo 
sacer is the “originary exception in which human life is included in the political order in 
being exposed to an unconditional capacity to be killed.”1 In Morrison’s novels, she often 
represents black characters as homo sacer figures. They are included in the social sphere, 
are submitted to following the law, yet receive no protection from it. They are always at 
the risk of violence, and when it is committed against them, these characters are often 
aware that they cannot seek justice or help from the political or social institutions that 
perpetuate this sort of violence, and that do not value them as complete, human subjects. 
In A Mercy, Morrison explores the colonial beginnings of America, and the slave trade. 
One of the story’s narrators, a slave girl named Florens, is depicted as a homo sacer 
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 Homo Sacer: Sovereign Power and Bare Life, trans. Heller-Roazen, Daniel, (Stanford UP, 1998), 85.  
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figure. In this novel, Morrison illuminates the formation of the slave laws in colonial 
America as laws that reduce the slaves to what Agamben defines as “bare life”. Morrison 
writes throughout the novel that the white colonists were in the business of “authorizing 
chaos in defense of order,” and “separated and protected all whites from all others 
forever,” as black slaves can be killed, raped, or punished without reason, however their 
owners see fit.
2
 The omniscient narrator continues explaining that the slave laws were 
thought to be for the good of the white colonists, “laws encouraging cruelty in exchange 
for common cause, if not common virtue.”3  This represents Agamben’s notion that the 
production of homo sacer, or bare life as such, is necessitated by the state to protect and 
support the individuals that hold political or social status—the chosen population that 
must be separated and protected. And it is this separation that defines the subjectivity of 
those within the protection of law and society. Agamben writes that “exteriority—the law 
of nature and the principle of the preservation of one’s own life—is truly the innermost 
center of the political system.”4 Morrison’s novels depict this concept, as the construction 
of black characters as homo sacer or bare life, directly correlates to the subjectivity of the 
white characters and communities in each work.  
 Copjec’s concept of subjectivity focuses on the inherent rupture at the core of the 
subject, working within the Lacanian notions of fantasy, desire, and drive. While many 
scholars have applied Lacanian psychoanalysis to Morrison’s work, Copjec’s focus on 
the subject’s rupturing, in terms of conceiving racial and feminine identity, are 
particularly useful to exploring how Morrison constructs the notion of subjectivity in her 
                                                          
2
 Toni Morrison, A Mercy, (NYC: Vintage Books, Inc., 2008), 11-12.  
3
 Ibid., 12.  
4
 Homo Sacer: Sovereign Power and Bare Life, 36.  
4 
 
work. Copjec relates that at the heart of the subject’s formation is a traumatic rupturing 
and inherent sense of lack, and the ethical act as well is defined as a self-rupturing choice. 
For Lacan, the subject’s entire construction of reality, built upon layers of fantasy, is 
inherently linked to this sense of lack, and what he defines as the Law of Desire that calls 
one to search and obtain the missing kernel of the self, which is a futile mission. This 
kernel refers to the sense of loss or lack that predicates our being, and is inherent and 
indissoluble in us. We as subjects must “wake up” from this fantasy of reality to 
understand the forces that cause each of us to act in accordance of our desire, and 
rationalizes the anti-ethical acts we perform in this pursuit. In Imagine There is No 
Woman, Joan Copjec explicates Lacan’s reading of the character Antigone, whom 
through the act of breaking the law and burying the body of her dead brother, becomes an 
ethical subject. Copjec explains that it is Antigone’s act of love for her brother that allows 
her to rise above the level of her function, and to proclaim her own decision and law 
separate from any other law, ideology, or notion of personal interest. Copjec explains that 
Antigone proves herself to be “autonomous,” as she “gives herself her own law and does 
not seek validation from any other authority.”5 Through this act of love for her brother, 
Antigone is able to break away from the fantasmatic realm of subjectivity and reality, 
rising above her own historical contingency, and risks everything—her biological life, 
but most importantly, her symbolic death and loss of signification in the societal realm. 
During this act, not only does Antigone separate herself from her own historical and 
social identity and position, she also exposes the void of the real that predicates the 
symbolic structure. In Morrison’s Beloved, the protagonist, Sethe, undergoes a similar 
                                                          
5
 Imagine There's No Woman: Ethics and Sublimation, (Cambridge, Mass: MIT Press, 2002), 41.  
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process, when in the moment of an unexpected event, she makes a decision that is self-
rupturing, and establishes her own law, and becomes autonomous in that moment. When 
presented with the possibility of having her children taken back to a life of slavery that 
she escaped, Sethe kills her baby, acting out of love as a mother, protecting her child 
from the traumatic life of slavery that would have reduced her to a farm tool or animal for 
the plantation owner’s use. Like Antigone, Sethe also follows Lacan’s ethical imperative 
by not giving way on her desire, and making a decision where there is no apparent 
decision to be made, acting out of love instead of self-interest or preservation. Morrison’s 
characters illustrate Copjec’s notion of the Lacanian subject while also demonstrating 
new ways of subjectivity, depicting a specifically black subjectivity and struggle.  
 In the first chapter of this thesis, I plan to outline Agamben’s notion of homo 
sacer, and Copjec’s Lacanian subject of lack. I will draw out these two concepts, 
showing the connections and contrasts between the two, and how they each conceptualize 
the notion of subjectivity in startling ways. I also plan to employ Morrison’s piece of 
literary criticism, Playing in the Dark: Whiteness and the Literary Imagination, to 
demonstrate how Morrison’s literary and intellectual project as a writer also aims to 
refigure subjectivity. This chapter will delineate how Agamben and Copjec’s theories 
deepen our understanding of Morrison’s work, and how Morrison’s novels help to 
expand upon these theories. In Playing in the Dark, Morrison argues that the construction 
of white subjectivity in classics of American literature and in the construction of 
American history as such, is inherently tied to the unfree, black, slave, or Africanist 
presence in these works. Morrison conceptualizes how white subjectivity, and notions of 
freedom and “Americanness,” as seen in the tradition of American literature, depends 
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upon having a contrasting image of a people who are not free. By the end of this chapter, 
I plan on introducing how Morrison’s work reimagines black subjectivity, and why 
staging a dialogue between Morrison, Agamben, and Copjec is beneficial both to the 
scholarship of Morrison’s work, and the work of these two theorists.  
 In the second chapter, I will move on to discuss Agamben’s political philosophy 
and concept of homo sacer, selecting two of Morrison’s novels to demonstrate how her 
work illustrates and expands upon Agamben’s theoretical project. The focus of this 
chapter will be to put Morrison and Agamben’s work in dialogue with each other. I will 
analyze Morrison's novels, A Mercy, and Home to accomplish this, outlining the 
connection between the black characters of these novels and Agamben’s concept of homo 
sacer, racism, and violence. The subjectivities of the oppressed and oppressors 
themselves in Morrison’s work reflects the concept of homo sacer, and provide an 
alternate illustration of this concept, apart from Agamben’s use of homo sacer to outline 
the construction of the modern nation state. Using the concept of homo sacer to analyze 
the construction of black subjectivity and white subjectivity in both A Mercy and Home, I 
plan to  demonstrate how Morrison’s black characters represent “bare life,” and how the 
historical oppression of African Americans illustrated in these novels provide another 
way to understand the biopolitical concept central to Agamben’s intellectual project. 
 Lastly, in the third chapter of this thesis, I will place Morrison in dialogue with 
Copjec, demonstrating how Morrison’s characters illustrate the notion of a ruptured 
subject, and why it is important to read her work through this lens. I plan to show how 
Morrison’s characters expand upon the notions of race, femininity, and subjectivity 
outlined by Copjec. To accomplish this, chapter 3 will focus on an analysis of Morrison’s 
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novels, The Bluest Eye, and Beloved, to establish  how Morrison’s work explores the way 
that subjects either adhere to, or “wake up” from the fantasy reality that is founded upon 
racial, gender, and sexual oppressions that are the source of trauma for each protagonist. 
Illustrating how the traumatic history of slavery persists as a facet of black consciousness 
and reality, and by writing the internal dialogues of each character, Morrison explores the 
desires, conscious and unconscious, of the oppressed and the oppressors in each 
narrative. At the center of both novels is a concern with personal and collective healing 
that must begin with the subject’s reconstitution.  
 While many scholars have analyzed the themes of race, violence, and subjectivity 
in Morrison’s work, Agamben and Copjec’s theoretical frameworks provide a new 
avenue of intervention in the current scholarship. The concepts outlined by each 
philosopher is reflected and illustrated through Morrison’s literary project, and I argue 
that the work of each of these theorists can be better understood or expanded when read 
in conjunction with Morrison’s novels. Morrison’s construction of black subjectivity, 
black femininity, and her potent illustrations of the rupture or void at the center of race 
and racism, challenges the reader’s understanding of these concepts. Her work also 
challenges the reader to rethink the history of race and racism in the United States, and 
how each individual participates and maintains such oppressive social and political 
structures. By reading Morrison, Agamben, and Copjec together, and placing Morrison in 
dialogue with these theorists, the novelty and value of how Morrison’s work rethinks 
subjectivity and race can be better understood. 
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CHAPTER 1: PLAYING IN THE DARK WITH AGAMBEN AND COPJEC  
Introduction 
 In Playing in the Dark: Whiteness and the Literary Imagination, Morrison argues 
that the construction of (white) American identity as illustrated in American literary 
classics, and in  American cultural history as such, is tied to an unfree, black, slave, or 
Africanist presence. Morrison conceptualizes how white subjectivity, with its notions of 
freedom and “Americanness,” as seen in the tradition of American literature, depends 
upon a contrasting image of a people who are not free. Morrison writes that the 
Africanism present in the American literary canon reveals the necessity of such an unfree 
presence to the construction of American identity and history, and “provides a way of 
contemplating chaos and civilization, desire and fear, and a mechanism for testing the 
problems and blessings of freedom”.6 Throughout this study, one can recognize the 
concern with race, trauma, language, and history at the center of Morrison’s literary 
project. The history of Black America is the history of the United States—not a separate, 
independent history---while ideas of freedom and oppression, justice and violence, white 
identity and black identity, are inextricably imbedded within one another, woven into the 
fabric of American history and society itself. Morrison contemplates these connections as 
evident in her analysis of the American literary tradition in “an effort to avert the critical 
gaze from the racial object to the racial subject; from the described and imagined to the 
describers and the imaginers; from the serving to the served”.7  This effort is manifest in 
not only Morrison’s scholarly work, but also in her literary work. Morrison’s literary and 
                                                          
6
 Playing in the Dark: Whiteness and the Literary Imagination, (Harvard University Press, 1992), 7 
7
 Ibid., 90.  
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intellectual projects often function to not only refigure black subjectivity, but notions of 
subjectivity itself, and she often explores the conscious and unconscious desires and 
perspectives of the oppressors in her fiction. Placing Morrison is dialogue with these two 
theorists, looking at Agamben’s concept of homo sacer and Copjec’s psychoanalytic 
subject of lack, introduces a new way of linking history, race and violence.  
 Biopolitics and Playing in the Dark 
 In Playing in the Dark, Morrison questions the notion that the presence of African 
Americans and African American history has not impacted canonical American literature. 
Morrison draws attention to the Africanist presence in these works, arguing that 
American literature, culture, and history is inherently informed by this presence—an 
acknowledgement she finds missing from American literary and historical scholarship. 
These observations have caused her to question whether revered qualities of American 
literature, such as “individualism, masculinity, social engagement versus historical 
isolation; acute and ambiguous moral problematics; the thematics of innocence coupled 
with an obsession with figurations of death and hell—are not in fact responses to a dark, 
abiding, signing Africanist presence”.8 This Africanist presence is not only explicitly 
represented by the figures of slaves and African Americans within a narrative, but also 
the symbolic expression of the color black or “darkness” representing fear, death, or evil, 
in contrast to symbolic expressions of the color white or “lightness” designating 
innocence, purity, or goodness. She argues that any mention of a “darkness” or 
“blackness” is not merely a symbolic use of color or aesthetic literary ploy, but that these 
expressions of color, and “darkness”—and of white or “lightness”—are inherently 
                                                          
8
 Playing in the Dark, 5.   
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racialized expressions, or racially coded. An explicit example of such metaphorical and 
symbolic uses of dark and light color representing good and evil, purity and sin, can be 
seen in Nathanial Hawthorne’s short story, “Young Goodman Brown,” when the 
protagonists for which the story is named wonders into the woods at night and happens 
upon dark bodies and presences, and what appears to be some sort of ceremony of 
witchcraft. Notions of “Americanness”, as expressed in American literature and its 
scholarship are Eurocentric and often defined by whiteness. Morrison aims to 
demonstrate how such notions are self-perpetuating, and depend upon the Africanist or 
dark presence found in canonical works of American literature. Morrison states that 
during her interrogation of American literary classics, “What became transparent were 
the self-evident ways that Americans choose to talk about themselves through and within 
a sometimes allegorical, sometimes metaphorical, but always choked representation of an 
Africanist presence”.9 Dark or Africanist illustrations in American literature then, 
function to express American fears and anxieties, and questions of American identity 
itself, in that American-ness is the effect of a chain of significations in which the trope of 
binarism—white and black—reifies identities. In other words, one cannot tangibly 
represent white without its binary other, black. This means that there is no substance in 
the category white and subjectivity built on it.  Morrison’s own works of fiction draw 
attention to the questions she raises in Playing in the Dark, questions that Clemens Spahr 
and Phillip Loffler identify in recent works of American literature by women of color, 
which they identify as an effort to critically interrogate the very concept of cultural 
                                                          
9
 Ibid., 17.   
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Americanness and its machineries of self-perpetuation.
10
 Morrison’s work explores and 
questions the ways that race and the presence of African Americans are imbedded in the 
cultural technologies that produce and sustain Eurocentric notions of American identity 
and subjectivity.  
 The contrasting image of an unfree Africanist presence necessary to the 
construction of American identity that Morrison recognizes throughout the tradition of 
American literature parallels Agamben’s concept of the figure of homo sacer central to 
his philosophical work. Agamben situates the production of subjectivity within the 
biopolitical structure of the modern nation state. In Homo Sacer, Agamben’s analysis 
begins with Foucault’s notion of biopolitics, defined as the intervention of politics into 
the production and care of the biological life of individuals within the state, or what 
Agamben designates as the “bare life” of individuals. Agamben expands upon Foucault’s 
theory of biopolitics to illustrate how totalitarian states, in particular the Nazi regime and 
the concentration camp, were conceived and operated. For Agamben, totalitarian regimes 
such as that of Nazi Germany illustrate the apexes of biopolitics operating in political 
structures that facilitate the total domination of civilization. Agamben’s notion of bare 
life is not merely biological life, it is life that can be killed with impunity, such as the 
Jews who were represented as bare life in Nazi Germany. Foucault states that 
“Biopolitics deals with the population, with the population as a problem that is at once 
scientific and political, as a biological problem and as power’s problem”.11 The life or 
health of the citizen, and therefore of the social body as a whole, is the basis for which 
                                                          
10
  "Introduction: Conceptions of Collectivity in Contemporary American Literature," Amerikastudien / 
American Studies 57, no. 2 (2012), 166. 
11
  "Society must be defended": lectures at the Collège de France, 1975-76. (New York: Picador, 2003), 245. 
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the state intercedes into citizens’ bodies, making decisions regarding whether certain 
lives are of value or not, and subjecting the body to regulatory processes in an effort to 
construct and maintain the life and health of the population, therefore ensuring that 
citizens’ bodies function to produce and reproduce for the state. Agamben states that this 
process involving “the entry of zoe into the sphere of the polis—the politicization of bare 
life as such—constitutes the decisive event of modernity and signals a radical 
transformation of the political-philosophical categories of classical thought”.12 The 
biological lives of citizens, as they begin to represent the central political concern of the 
state, marks the beginning of the political structure of modern democratic nations, and the 
construction of the subject within this system. For Agamben, this shift in political 
structure in which life is subordinate to it leads to the consideration of the “biopolitical as 
the threshold of ‘bare life,’” demarcating this shift as “catastrophic”.13 The property of 
sovereign power over the lives of citizens is the power to produce bare life, complicating 
the man/citizen dichotomy in the biopolitical apparatus of the modern nation state.  
 The man/citizen dichotomy that begins to break down in a biopolitical system 
defines the modern nation state and subjectivity for Agamben, and is why the figure of 
homo sacer becomes central to his argument. Through tracing the history of the figure of 
homo sacer from antiquity, Agamben defines this figure as one that can be killed without 
it being considered a crime or  homicide, and whose death may not serve as a sacrifice
14
. 
This figure is at once abandoned by the law, yet is subjected to the law’s punishment, 
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 Homo Sacer: Sovereign Power and Bare Life, trans. Heller-Roazen, Daniel, (Stanford UP, 1998), 3. 
13
  Charles T. Lee, “Bare Life, Interstices, and the Third Space of Citizenship,” Women's Studies 
Quarterly 38.1/2 (2010), 102.  
14
 Homo Sacer: Sovereign Power and Bare Life, 83.   
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representing a situation where the man/citizen distinction becomes difficult to perceive. 
Bare life is what represents this threshold between man and citizen. For Agamben, 
sovereign power lies in the production of bare life, using the figure of homo sacer to 
theorize the political justification of violence, and to demonstrate how modern 
biopolitical states necessitate the production of bare life. Homo sacer is a figure that has 
been forcibly reduced to bare life. He delineates methodologies of democratic states that 
politicize each subject from birth, describing the subject as a virtually passive entity 
constructed by and inscribed within the political system. What is most striking about 
Agamben’s philosophical inquiry into modern subjectivity is the notion that within a 
biopolitical system, a nation state is defined by its population—the people that live within 
it, rather than the land it occupies. This radical shift in how the state conceives of its 
property, so to speak, is what most concerns Agamben.  
 Important to Agamben’s delineation of the figure of homo sacer, is the notion that 
the production of bare life is not only necessitated by the modern nation state, but the 
subjectivity and identity of the population of recognized citizens is defined by the 
exclusion of those who are not recognized citizens. Without a population that is stripped 
of political status and reduced to a state of bare life, there would be no way to define the 
protected and valued citizen. The protected population of the modern nation state is only 
able to be defined through the existence of another group that is not “free,” as it were, 
and not included in the recognized population of citizens. Exclusion from the political 
sphere, this exception to the rule, is what justifies the rule and validates the power of the 
state, and the rights of the individuals included within the system. Agamben explains that 
the “exception does not subtract itself from the rule,” but rather “the rule, suspending 
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itself, gives rise to the exception and, maintaining itself in relation to the exception, first 
constitutes itself as the rule”.15 The state is founded upon excluding certain groups or 
individuals, and validates its own power through this necessary facet of its structure. This 
represents a view of collective identification and subjective identification as being 
inherently rooted in the separation and restraint, or destruction, of the other.
16
 Agamben 
relates this political understanding to the historical phenomena of the Third Reich and the 
concentration camps meant to separate the Jews from the rest of the population.  
Agamben references the foundation for this line of political thinking as “Exteriority—the 
law of nature and the principle of the preservation of one’s own life,” as being “truly the 
innermost center of the political system”17. Protecting the social body from an outside 
threat is seen to be a central motivation of the Nazi regime and their extreme efforts to 
exterminate the Jews, as they considered Jews a threat to the wellbeing of European 
civilization. The identification of the people relies on separation from a foreign or 
threatening other. Agamben reiterates that the “The separation of the Jewish body is the 
immediate production of the specifically German body, just as its production is the 
application of the rule”.18 The social body is then produced through the process of 
separation from and the destruction of a threatening other, and relies on this process to 
define and protect the identity of the nation state and its citizens.  
 Similarly, the separation of the black body from the white population through 
enslavement in early America functioned to produce the (white) American body. In much 
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 Ibid., 18.   
16
  Pamela M. Lee, "My Enemy/My Friend." Grey Room, no. 24 (2006), 104.  
17
 Ibid., 36.   
18
 Ibid., 174.   
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the same manner that Agamben identifies the process of separation and exclusion at the 
heart of state violence and the mission of the Third Reich and concentration camps, the 
enslaved Africanist presence Morrison recounts in the American literary canon illustrates 
this same process of separation and exclusion at the root of American history and 
identity.  Morrison is clear that this process of exclusion was foundational to the 
formation of the young United States in an era when the country forged its character and 
established its power. She is, however, critical of the notion that such political motives 
and the racism employed in its pursuit is an intrinsic or inevitable occurrence—it is a 
consciously motivated and self-preserving project to be sure—but it is not organic. She 
clarifies that “Among Europeans and the Europeanized, this shared process of 
exclusion—of assigning designation and value—has led to the popular and academic 
notion that racism is a ‘natural,’ if irritating phenomenon”.19 Morrison’s definition of the 
Africanist, unfree figures present in American literature, and the formation of (white) 
American identity against this presence, reflects Agamben’s political understanding that 
the collective effort to define an identity against another separated group is inherently 
linked to the political establishment of liberal and free subjects.
20
 Morrison notes how 
white writers in the American literary canon seem to write the enslaved Africanist 
presence into their stories without racial consciousness, and it is this lack of racial 
consciousness in American literary criticism that Morrison takes to task in Playing in the 
Dark. Just as Agamben claims that it is homo sacer and the production of bare life that 
democratic state structures necessitate, Morrison claims that the enslaved black body was 
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essential for the formation of the democratic American state and its “free” citizens. The 
enslaved Africanist presence in American literature is representative of bare life, or a 
homo sacer figure through which American identity has been constructed.  
  Agamben employs the figure of homo sacer throughout his philosophical project 
as a manner of analyzing notions of state power and the value or nonvalue of human 
individuals within the modern nation state, in order to better define or understand notions 
of modern subjectivity. The figure of homo sacer provides a contrasting image for 
politically recognized and protected individuals to be defined against, and an avenue to 
express concepts of oppression and enslavement, inclusion and exclusion. Morrison 
argues that within American literature and history, the black body represents the conduit 
through which such notions are explored and questioned. She writes that “The slave 
population, it could be and was assumed, offered itself up as surrogate selves for 
meditation on problems of human freedom, its lure and its elusiveness”.21 The black body 
was visually marked by difference by white men in the New World, which provided an 
avenue for whites to assign and contain their own anxieties of freedom and oppression, 
civility and primal desire confronted in the untamed space of the young United States. 
Morrison argues “It was this Africanism, deployed as rawness and savagery, that 
provided the staging ground and arena for the elaboration of the quintessential American 
identity”.22 In essence, Morrison recognizes the excluded, yet ever present Africanist 
presence in American literature as the very expression of American consciousness. This 
concept reflects Agamben’s claim that “The outside is not another space that resides 
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beyond a determinate space, but rather, it is the passage, the exteriority that gives it 
access—in a word, it is its face, its eidos”.23 The black body and Africanism expressed in 
the American literary canon is then not a contrasting image against which (white) 
American identity is formed, but Morrison rather arrives at the notion that this 
Africanism presence is itself an expression of American identity and consciousness. 
Morrison emphasizes that this slave population “is convenient in every way, not the least 
of which is self-definition,” as in the early United States, the “new white male can now 
persuade himself that savagery is ‘out there’”.24 White men exorcized their own anxieties, 
fears, and internal struggles for freedom to the enslaved black body as homo sacer, to 
validate their dominance at the expense of others’ oppression. The ego-reinforcing 
project of exclusion and separation enacted by white men through slavery is a concept 
explicated by both Morrison and Agamben.    
 Morrison identifies white men’s effort to define, separate, and contain the black 
body as the foundation of American identity and democratic state structure. In parallel to 
this notion, Agamben claims that it is the power to forcibly reduce life to bare life as 
such, or homo sacer, that defines state power or sovereign power. Agamben states that 
homo sacer represents the “originary exclusion through which the political dimension 
was first constituted,” defining the “production of bare life” as the “originary activity of 
sovereignty”.25 It is the ability, or the power to enslave, to define the value or nonvalue of 
life, to reduce an individual or a group of people to a state of bare life without political 
status, that is the foundation of sovereign power. Morrison also identifies the power to 
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exclude and enslave as the founding force that built the liberal, independent US American 
state. The slave-master relationship is at the root of not only the American literary 
tradition, but American history. The need to establish difference in order to establish an 
American identity is reflected in Ralph Waldo Emerson’s “The American Scholar,” in 
which he outlines the deliberate project of the construction of a free, American man that 
stands above others.
26
 At the end of this speech, he claims, “A nation of men will for the 
first time exist, because each believes himself inspired by the Divine Soul which also 
inspires all men,” at once acknowledging the conscious construction of this land of men, 
and claiming the right to dominance above others through the “Divine Soul” that grants 
it.
27
  In a biopolitical apparatus in which the state itself is defined by its population, by 
the people instead of the land it occupies, the relationship of the enslaved to the slave 
owner is at the root of such a system. Agamben emphasizes that “what seems so 
scandalous to us moderns—namely, property rights over persons, could in fact be the 
originary form of property, the capture (the ex-ceptio) of the use of bodies in the juridical 
order”.28 Just as Agamben defines the ownership of bodies as perhaps the original form 
of property ownership, to capture and produce bare life, so too does Morrison 
demonstrate how the slave/master relationship is not only symbolic, but foundational to 
the concept of the United States and to its construction.  
Playing in the Dark and the Lacanian Subject of Lack 
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 In Playing in the Dark, Morrison is not only explicating systems of exploitation 
and racial oppression at the center of United States history, she is also exploring the 
underlying psychical constructions of (white) American identity as illustrated in 
American literature. It is due to Morrison’s critical exploration of white and black 
subjectivity throughout her writing, both fiction and nonfiction, that much of her work 
has been critiqued from a Lacanian lens. She herself recognizes the usefulness of 
psychoanalysis to interrogate notions of national and racial identity. In the preface to 
Playing in the Dark, Morrison states that “The narrative into which life seems to cast 
itself surfaces most forcefully in certain kinds of psychoanalysis”.29 Morrison’s concern 
with language and how it is racially encoded, along with the kinds of “unconscious” 
desires and perceptions that the use of language reveals, does lend her work to a Lacanian 
lens of analysis. It is for this reason that Joan Copjec’s specific Lacanian lens may be 
most useful in exploring Morrison’s writing, and Morrison’s writing may also be a useful 
companion to Copjec’s theoretical work, providing potent illustrations for Copjec’s 
analyses of the ruptured subject, racial identity, and Lacanian ethics. Copjec’s work 
operates from “the belief that psychoanalysis is the mother tongue of our modernity and 
that the important issues of our time are scarcely articulable outside the concepts it has 
forged,” a belief that parallels Morrison’s own claims of the relevance of psychoanalysis 
quoted above.
30
 Employing a Lacanian lens to explore the psychological underpinnings 
of American (white) identity and racial oppression at the center of US history that 
Morrison delineates in Playing in the Dark, will function to illuminate these concepts.  
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 Copjec’s concept of subjectivity focuses on the inherent rupture at the core of the 
subject, working within the Lacanian notions of fantasy, desire, and drive. The Lacanian 
subject comes into being through the traumatic event of entering the world of language in 
the symbolic order, which leaves the subject with an inherent sense of lack. Copjec’s 
intellectual project deals with Lacanian ethics, outlining why it is that we perform anti-
ethical acts in an attempt to fulfill desires to gain a sense of wholeness. For Lacan, the 
subject’s entire construction of reality, built upon layers of fantasy, is inherently linked to 
this sense of lack, and what he defines as the Law of Desire that calls one to search and 
obtain the missing kernel of the self, which is a futile mission. This kernel refers to the 
sense of loss or lack that predicates our being, and is inherent and indissoluble in us. We 
as subjects must “wake up” from this fantasy of reality to understand the forces that cause 
each of us to act in accordance of our desire, and rationalizes the anti-ethical acts we 
perform in this pursuit. Copjec explains that the rupture or cut that predicates being 
“carves up the body image and thus drives the subject to seek its being beyond that which 
its image presents to it; it causes the subject to always find in its image something 
lacking”.31 This sense of lack causes the subject to search for something external to it as 
an attempt to return to a primordial sense of wholeness experienced before entering the 
symbolic order. Copjec reiterates that “The subject constructed by language finds itself 
detached from a part of itself. And it is this primary detachment that renders fruitless all 
the subject’s efforts for a reunion with its complete being”.32 This perception of the 
subject parallels Morrison’s explanation of the construction of white subjectivity and 
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American identity in Playing in the Dark, as white subjectivity itself is founded on this 
sense of lack. To ameliorate the sense of this lack, white subjects need its other, 
blackness.   
  Copjec’s explanation of the Lacanian subject also functions to delineate what the 
concept of race provides for the subject, granting an avenue for a perceived sense of 
wholeness and collectivity, though race itself is predicated by an essential rupture or 
void. Morrison explains that any study of race and racism should also focus on “the 
impact of racism on those who perpetrate it,” continuing to note that “It seems both 
poignant and striking how avoided and unanalyzed is the effect of racist inflection on the 
subject”.33 Morrison’s argument for the construction of white subjectivity and American 
identity as evidenced by her critique of American literary classics, is an attempt to begin 
to explore this important question that is necessary to understand why race and racism are 
avenues through which the subject strives to achieve a sense of completeness, though 
Lacan tells us that this can never be achieved. Race is a fantasy reality of identity that a 
subject can cling to as an attempt to alleviate this sense of lack, and racism as well stems 
from this fantasy. Following Lacan’s lead, Copjec explains what it is, exactly, that the 
subject stands to “gain” from the concept of race, and racism: an “escape” from mortality. 
She writes that “modern man, refusing to accept the finitude that modern thought thrust 
upon him, doubles himself through a notion of race that allows him to survive his own 
death”. 34 The concept of race in early America granted white men an attempt to satisfy 
desires for wholeness, to cling to fantasy and not face the real of their existence as 
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incomplete, mortal beings. Working with the Lacanian concept of jouissance—a 
traumatic experience of excess pleasure—Sheldon George explains that the history of 
American slavery “has produced both race and racism as modes of jouissance, as 
methods of accessing being”.35 This understanding of race and why one partakes in acts 
of racism provides a point of reference for Morrison’s study of (white) American identity 
and how she sees this illustrated in American literature.  
  Morrison reiterates the notion that the enslavement of African Americans served 
as the basis for the construction of (white) American identity, interrogating the 
underlying motives or psychic reasoning of the oppressor. Morrison explains that the 
Africanism she sees in works of American literature, which emerged “under the pressures 
of ideological and imperialistic rationales for subjugation,” is “thoroughly serviceable, 
companionably ego-reinforcing, and pervasive”.36 Owning slaves, or at least having the 
image of an unfree people against which a white man can forge his own identity is “ego-
reinforcing,” sustaining what Lacan would claim is the subject’s fantastical sense of 
wholeness, freedom, and in this case, superiority in racial hierarchy.  In this sense, the 
ego-reinforcing practice of slavery and distanced Africanism illustrated in American 
literature, is inherent to and indicative of the construction of a collective (white) 
American identity, and to the notion of American exceptionalism. This parallels Copjec’s 
claim that “Singularity itself, that which appears most to disperse society, is here posited 
as essential rather than antagonistic to a certain modern social bond”.37  In this way, we 
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can begin to understand the concept of race as a method of subjective validation and a 
sense of collective belonging, both invented and sustained by white men in need of an 
avenue of subjective and collective identification. Analyzing the formation of (white) 
American identity through a psychoanalytic lens reflects Agamben’s notion of 
citizenship, homo sacer, and the exclusionary principle that is the foundation of a 
biopolitical state structure. The separation of valued citizens from bare life, the 
demarcation of those two categories, resonates with Copjec’s Lacanian subject of lack 
and notions of race, in which race becomes a threshold of division in a biopolitical 
structure. It also functions to illustrate the difference between Agamben’s intellectual 
project and that of Copjec who works from a Lacanian framework---rather than focus on 
the structure of a biopolitical system, psychoanalysis provides the tools necessary to 
delineate the psychic processes that are the reason for the subject’s participation and 
identification within such a system, in which the lacking subject adheres to this system in 
an attempt to gain a sense of wholeness and identity.       
 In Playing in the Dark, Morrison relates that the reasons why immigrants fled to 
the “New World” is often understood to be due to a strong compulsion to search for a 
new existence, or a clean slate. This is important to understanding why it is that racial 
hierarchy and slavery flourished in a space where many sought independence, liberation, 
and opportunity. It is also important to understanding the Africanism that Morrison finds 
in American literature. For most of these immigrants, the “Old World” meant “poverty, 
prison, social ostracism, and, not infrequently, death.”38 Fleeing to the “New World” 
meant a chance to recreate oneself and one’s circumstance, in a place free from the Old 
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World’s oppressive history. Morrison explains that “One could be released from a useless 
binding, repulsive past into a kind of history-lessness, a blank page waiting to be 
inscribed”.39 Copjec defines the attempt to begin with a blank page, so to speak, as an 
effort to escape what Lacan defines as the traumatic Real that cannot be defined through 
language, and represents that rupture or void at the center of the subject’s being. Using 
modernism as an example, Copjec explains this attempt to escape the real and history as 
such as a “negative gesture” or “erasure.”40 Though as both Copjec via Lacan and 
Morrison remind us, history is not escapable, and often repeats itself or returns in 
startling, or unsettling ways. Copjec reiterates that “There is no arguing with the real, no 
negating it, since history itself depends on it. It is precisely because it cannot be negated 
that we say it eternally returns or repeats”. 41The sense of anxiety, oppression, and lack of 
freedom that was the impetus for fleeing to the New World could not have merely 
vanished, but persisted. The practice of slavery and roots of America racism, as well as 
the Africanism that Morrison identifies in American fiction, can be understood as a 
repetition of the history that those who fled to the New World tried to escape. Morrison’s 
own works of fiction explore this notion of history, trauma, and repetition. Ashraf H.A. 
Rushdy relates that it is these “questions about desire and despair, about subject and 
object, about the possibility for self-knowledge, about, finally, memory and being that 
Toni Morrison’s novels ask”.42 These questions Morrison explores in Playing in the 
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Dark, and in her fiction benefit from and reflect the very questions with which 
psychoanalysis is invested in.  
 By exploring the ways that expressions of (white) American identity are 
indicative of a sense of white subjectivity in a racist nation, Morrison arrives at the 
conclusion that the dark Africanism found in American literature is an expression of the 
white writers themselves, and of white subjectivity. Morrison explains that “As a writer 
reading, I came to realize the obvious: the subject of the dream is the dreamer”.43 In other 
words, dark Africanist expressions are also representative of a repressed and externalized 
facet of (white) American consciousness—a repressed sense of lack within the self, not 
outside of it. Morrison reiterates that what she aims to study is “how the image of a 
reined-in, bound, suppressed, and repressed darkness became objectified in American 
literature as an Africanist persona”.44 Africanism can be understood as an expression of 
anxiety, one that is cast off and relegated to an image external to the self in an effort to 
banish or repress it. When faced with the real of one’s existence, with the incompleteness 
and mortality of being, this action allows the subject to sustain his/her fantasy of reality 
in which the subject is a whole, complete, being, allowing the subject to avoid contact 
with the real, traumatic rupture or void that predicates being. Copjec explains that 
“Anxiety signals that the threat cannot be exteriorized, objectified, that it is instead 
internal, brought on by an encounter with that limit which prevents one’s coincidence 
with oneself”.45 Rather than face what Lacan terms the traumatic real of being, these 
Africanist expressions represent a repressed and externalized fear of the subject’s own 
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lack of freedom, what follows here is fantasized into that which can allow the subject to 
overcome the lack. This notion of Africanism reflects the Lacanian notion of the 
“monstrosity of the neighbor,” or what Lacan labeled as das Ding (the Thing), that Freud 
designates as the “ultimate object of our desires in its unbearable intensity and 
impenetrability”.46 In other words, the subject represses within itself that which it fears 
the most, one’s deepest anxieties, desires, and emptiness, and casts it onto others to 
negate confronting the traumatic void of the real.  
 For Morrison, this self-reflexive relationship of the white American writer to the 
Africanist presence in American literature is inextricably tied to race and the color of the 
slave body in contrast to the free white body. The concept of race and color intertwined 
with freedom and oppression is central to “Americanness”. Morrison reiterates that 
“Race, in fact, now functions as a metaphor so necessary to the construction of 
Americanness that it rivals the old pseudo-scientific and class-informed racisms whose 
dynamics we are more used to deciphering”.47 American identity and the American state 
are founded upon notions of race, to the point that Americanness cannot be defined 
without it. Morrison explains that “American means white, and Africanist people struggle 
to make the term applicable to themselves with ethnicity and hyphen after hyphen after 
hyphen”.48 If  one is white and a citizen of the United States, he/she is simply labeled as 
“American,” while every other group is defined by another term before American—
African American, Latin American, Asian American, Native American—and the list of 
groups designated as “other” before “American” continues. Whiteness can be understood 
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as what Lacan defines as the “master signifier,” upon which an entire discourse is 
constructed.
49
 Sheldon George claims that “Racial whiteness is just such a signifier, 
establishing slavery as a nodal point for the myths of race that still retain levels of 
structural control over American society and its social Symbolic”.50 Race is what 
organizes and defines American society today, and this is due to the history of slavery 
that built and defined the birth of the American state.  The concepts of “Americanness” or 
American identity are in-articulable or impossible to understand apart from the discourse 
and concept of race, as designated by the “master signifier” of whiteness. Morrison 
clarifies that the color of the slave body was not just a color, but had been imbedded with 
meaning, one defined and employed by scholars at the very least beginning in the 18
th
 
century, the same historical moment when scholars began to explore concepts of “natural 
history” and the “inalienable rights of man,” or “human freedom”.51 Ideas of liberty, 
independence, and the rights of man upon which the US is understood to be founded were 
conceived in tandem with definitions and ideas of race, and worked to further bolster and 
define the free white man in early America.  
 Copjec explores why it is that race is such a persistent, violent, and organizing 
concept in the social symbolic. She explains the onset of modernity expelled the notion of 
an afterlife as real or guaranteed, and the notion of race allowed one to escape mortality, 
and to somehow continue to live on after death by being part of a lineage that continues 
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 Copjec states that “This idea is a negative one… Yet it is what survives of 
eternity in the modern world, and it lends to a certain notion of ideality that is the source 
of its profound violence and its disdain for every historical obstacle, every contingency 
that opposes it”.53 The need to transcend historical contingency that Morrison reiterates 
as the reason immigrants traveled to the New World, necessitating a subjective and 
collective identity of Americanness, constructed with notions of freedom and 
independence, illustrates Copjec’s Lacanian understanding of the appeal and endurance 
of race.  Copjec’s delineation of race and its appeal is rooted in Lacan’s concept of the 
“super-ego”. The super-ego exerts pressure on the subject to enjoy the jouissance, or 
excess pleasure, of race to an obscene degree. The fantasy that sustains the subject’s 
reality is inherently linked to a sense of lack, and what Lacan defines as the Law of 
Desire, imbedded in the super-ego, that calls one to search and obtain the missing kernel 
of the self. The Law of Desire is the “agency that tells you to act in accord with your 
desire,” while the super-ego “exerts its unbearable pressure upon us on behalf of our 
betrayal of the ‘law of desire’”.54 The concept of race taps into these psychical 
components, providing the subject with the false perception that race will negate the 
feeling of lack, while also providing an avenue to not only perceive oneself as complete, 
but as limitlessness by being part of a lineage that will continue. The super-ego exerts 
pressure on the subject to satisfy his/her inherent sense of lack by identifying oneself 
through the concept of race.  
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  Just as Africanism is a conduit for the expression of (white) American anxiety, 
fears, and desires, it also functions to define and validate white men’s sense of freedom. 
Much in the same way that Agamben’s homo sacer figure functions to define the group 
of recognized citizens, the presence of slaves, and the Africanism expressed in American 
literature highlights the freedom of white men. Copjec via Lacan provides a 
psychoanalytic understanding of this subjective and collective identification, rather the 
sort of structural exploration of biopolitics that Agamben is invested in. The construction 
of Africanism as such, is arises from the Law of Desire and the super-ego, providing an 
avenue through which the “American self knows itself as not enslaved, but free; not 
repulsive, but desirable; not helpless, but licensed and powerful; not history-less, but 
historical; not damned, but innocent; not a blind accident of evolution, but a progressive 
fulfillment of destiny”. Race and the expression of Africanism not only betray the (white) 
American subject’s anxiety, it also grants a certain pleasure and enjoyment to the subject 
that it validates. Working from Freud’s Moses and Monotheism, Copjec presents the case 
for why psychoanalysis provides a method for interrogating notions of race and the 
pleasure a subject can experience from investing his/herself within such a matrix. Copjec 
explains that in Moses and Monotheism, Freud stripped ideality away from race and 
revealed an “anonymous root of racial identity, in a useless, exorbitant pleasure,” or what 
Lacan defines as jouissance.
55
 An excess of pleasure, or racial jouissance the subject 
experiences accounts for the close proximity of the white, free body to the enslaved, 
black body. This excess of pleasure can also account for Agamben’s biopolitical 
explanation of the slave-master relationship as the “striking and despondent intimacy 
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between master and slave”.56 Morrison cites Mark Twain’s The Adventures of 
Huckleberry Finn as an example of an expression of this relationship in American 
literature. She writes that it is only through Huck and the slave Jim’s close relationship 
that Huck is able to articulate his sense of independence and freedom, and why Jim could 
not be freed at the end of the story. Morrison explains that “freedom has no meaning for 
Huck or to the text without the specter of enslavement, the anodyne to individualism; the 
yardstick of absolute power over the life of another; the signed, marked, informing and 
mutating presence of a black slave.
57
   
Conclusion 
 Questions of race, history, trauma, and subjective identification that Morrison 
explores in Playing in the Dark and in her fiction, benefit from and enhance the concept 
of biopolitics, as conceived by Agamben, and Copjec’s conception of the Lacanian 
subject and race as predicated by a traumatic void, or inherent rupture. Placing these three 
writers in dialogue with one another is valuable in interrogating notions of American 
exceptionalism, race, racial violence, and the construction of (white) American identity. 
It will also be useful in understanding how Morrison explores black subjectivity, as a 
result of white subjectivity and dominance, within her works of fiction. Morrison’s 
critique of American identity and subjectivity in Playing in the Dark is an innovative and 
necessary approach to understanding why the American state is constructed through 
racism and oppression, why it persists so today, and lays the groundwork to study how 
race and racism impact those who perpetrate and sustain such systems of oppression in 
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tandem with further study of the impact of racism on the oppressed. The intellectual 
projects of each of these writers aims to explore notions of subjectivity, and why it is that 
individuals adhere to and support oppressive structures in an attempt to claim a sense of 
wholeness or autonomy. The concepts and discourses that each writer provides is of value 
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CHAPTER 2: BIOPOLITICS AND THE RACIALIZATION OF LAW AND 
CITIZENSHIP IN A MERCY AND HOME 
Introduction 
 Morrison’s novels often explore and question the ways race, oppression, and 
violence are imbedded within the cultural technologies that produce and sustain 
Eurocentric-oriented notions of American identity and subjectivity. To accomplish this, 
her novels are each purposefully set in a specific moment in American history, moments 
whose historiographies are mythologized as indicative of American “progress”. 
Morrison’s novels illustrate the gender, class, and racial violence that proliferates in these 
mythologized historical periods, and in doing so, demonstrates the violence at the core of 
the American state. Her stories demonstrate that the law is not a guarantor of justice, but 
instead functions to perpetuate injustices against its citizens, particularly its marginalized 
populations, in the name of prosperity and protection for recognized and valued citizens. 
In a 1974 review of The Black Book published in The New York Times Magazine, a 
project Morrison undertook as an editor for Random House, Inc. before publishing her 
first novel, she takes these historiographies to task, stating that “There are very few 
examinations of U.S. economics as the growth of a country that had generations of free 
labor to assure that growth. Or of the legal history of this country as primarily the efforts 
of the courts to contain blacks.”58 Morrison writes that in the process of editing The Black 
Book, she was “overwhelmed with the connecting tissue between black and white 
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history,” a connection that “was not a simple one of white oppressor and black victim.”59 
This connection is multifaceted, and Morrison aims to demonstrate that white and black 
history in the Unites States are not separate phenomena, but rather a collective and 
intertwined history, and should be understood and studied as such.  
 Morrison’s novels A Mercy and Home each illustrate and explore this collective 
history by dispelling mythologized accounts of their historical settings. A Mercy is set in 
the 1680’s in the north during colonization, when the slave trade in America is just 
beginning to prosper. This time is often perceived as the “birth” of America, defined by 
the excitement and liberty the New World provided for those leaving Europe in search of 
a new life and opportunity. A Mercy narrates the foundations of American racism and the 
racialization of slavery and oppression during colonization, combatting the dominant 
narrative of prosperity, independence, and adventure attributed to this era, for one defined 
by division and forceful dominance. Home is set during the 1950’s in the South, a 
historical moment often characterized by the growth of the American middle class and 
the promise and fulfillment of the American dream. This novel reminds the reader that 
this era is also characterized by the Jim Crow black codes in the South, and the Korean 
War that is often overlooked as part of the “post-war” decades following World War II. 
As Morrison details in Playing in the Dark, the formation of American identity, along 
with notions of independence and liberty, were not formulated apart from slavery, but are 
inherently connected to it, much in the same way that the growth of the middle class 
during the 1950’s and notions of the actualization of the American Dream during this 
time, are also inherently linked to the black codes and Jim Crow. Just as Agamben claims 
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in Homo Sacer that it is the production of bare life necessitated in a biopolitical structure 
through which democratic states operate, these novels demonstrate how slavery and the 
continuance of racial oppression is foundational to the American state. These systems of 
oppression and the laws under which they operate are “interpreted and twisted by those in 
dominant positions and manipulated to conceal the interest of racial or gendered power in 
the mendacious language of universality,” and it is this history that Morrison’s fiction 
draws our attention to.
60
 Agamben’s analysis of homo sacer and biopolitics is useful in 
interrogating these oppressive structures, and Morrison’s explorations of subjective 
identification and formation within a racialized American system both expands upon and 
provides further illustration to Agamben’s conception of biopolitics. Analyzing these 
novels through the lens of biopolitics demonstrates the collective and interconnected 
histories of white and black America, and accounts for the state’s validation of racial 
violence and oppression.  
Biopolitics, and the Construction of Racial Hierarchy in A Mercy 
 Agamben’s biopolitical analysis of violence and the modern democratic nation 
state hinges on the classical concept of homo sacer. Homo sacer represents what he 
designates as “bare life” that can be killed with impunity, but cannot be sacrificed—a 
human animal, or an individual who is included in the social/political realm through 
his/her exclusion, holds no political status, and is therefore left without protection from 
the state.
61
  Homo sacer is a figure that is submitted to the law, but is not protected by it. 
For Agamben, homo sacer represents an individual who is denied political and symbolic 
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signification. Agamben writes that homo sacer is the “originary exception in which 
human life is included in the political order in being exposed to an unconditional capacity 
to be killed”.62 In Morrison’s novels, she often represents black characters as homo sacer 
figures. They are included in the social sphere, are submitted to a rule of law that 
discriminates against them, yet receive no protection from it. Homo sacer represents the 
dangerous binary biopolitics operates through, one defined by the separation of chosen, 
recognized citizens from excluded others. In A Mercy, Morrison draws attention to the 
construction of such a binary in the New World, invoking a “deeply ironic look at 
American origins”.63 What is unique about Morrison’s depiction of the New World and 
colonization in A Mercy is that each of the characters is represented as homo sacer, 
particularly the female characters. Any sense of solidarity that exists between them, 
however, fractures as notions of racial hierarchy become widely accepted, and formalized 
through law. Susan Strehle claims that American exceptionalism, the notion of a 
“redeemer nation” and its “chosen people” central to American cultural identity, also 
accounts for the reasoning behind white colonists’ enslavement of people of color, 
explaining that “A Mercy emphasizes divisions, distinctions, and distances, as it portrays 
in the colonies a potential community stifled at its inception by the assumption of an 
exceptionalist destiny”.64 The characters Jacob Vaark and Rebekka Vaark perhaps most 
fully portray this sense of American exceptionalism, as they each forgo their sense of 
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morality and “liberal” thinking to participate in a system of hierarchy and oppression, 
practices they both pointedly stand against at the novel’s beginning.  
 A Mercy is set at a time before the racialization of slavery, when the slave codes 
were first being implemented. Morrison refers to Bacon’s Rebellion (1676) in the 
beginning of the novel when the reader is first introduced to Jacob Vaark, an Anglo-
Dutch settler and trader, as he is riding through the territory where this rebellion took 
place. The omniscient narrator tells the reader that Jacob has his guard up, as “In this 
territory he could not be sure of friend or foe”.65This is due to the fact that there is no 
visual marker, such as race or class, yet available to designate someone as trustworthy or 
otherwise to Jacob. The narrator explains that the rebellion was fought by “an army of 
blacks, natives, whites, mulattoes—freedmen, slaves, and indentured [servants]” that had 
“waged war against the local gentry led by members of that very class”.66 Men from 
every race and class had banded together in an attempt to overthrow the ruling class. This 
rebellion illustrates the current, yet changing landscape of the colonies at this time. Being 
a slave was not yet synonymous with being black—there were a number of indentured 
servants and slaves of a variety races and ethnicities, including Native Americans, who 
labored together.
67
 This rebellion instigated the formation of the slave laws, so that the 
lower classes would be divided by race, preventing their joining in a form of resistance 
together against the gentry. The narrator explains the reasoning behind the black codes, 
that by “eliminating manumission, gatherings, travel and bearing arms for black people 
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only; by granting license to any white to kill any black for any reason; by compensating 
owners for a slave’s maiming or death, they separated and protected all whites from all 
others forever”.68 A hierarchy was established to divide the laboring classes, and race 
became the mark of this division, fueled by the growth of the slave trade in the Americas. 
Jessica W. Cantiello reiterates that the novel’s setting “approaches the era when race 
began to be codified in the United States; most of the characters were born into a 
relatively pre-racial era but would die in a racial period”.69 “Pre-racial” does not mean 
that the characters in A Mercy are not raced, but that their racial identities are understood 
differently than they would be in later periods in American history.  
 Jacob views himself as morally above such hierarchical forms of oppression and 
violence. He understands laws such as the slave codes to be “lawless laws encouraging 
cruelty in exchange for common cause, if not common virtue”.70 His perceived sense of 
compassion is emphasized when the narrator tells us that he dismounted his horse twice 
during his journey, the second time in order to rescue a baby raccoon whose leg was 
trapped in a tree break.
71
 Jacob is traveling to Maryland, at that time owned by the king, 
in order to collect a debt owed him, the narrator tells of his “disdain” for the Catholics in 
Maryland and how they have amassed wealth through the slave and tobacco businesses, 
which are dependent to each other.
72
 However, this is not enough to stop him from doing 
business with these people. Once he arrives at his destination, his debtor, D’Ortega, 
offers Jacob slaves to repay his debt, to which Jacob “winced” in response, as “Flesh was 
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not his commodity”.73 In order to “silence” D’Ortega, Jacob points to a slave woman with 
a baby and says he will take her.
74
 The slave woman instead offers her daughter, Florens, 
in her place, and a deal is struck. Despite Jacob’s sense of moral superiority and disdain 
for the slave trade, he accepts a slave and does make “flesh his commodity.” Directly 
following this business exchange, the narrator states that Jacob “was determined to prove 
that his own industry could amass the fortune, the station, D’Ortega claimed without 
trading his conscience for coin.”75 Though Jacob did not literally “trade his conscience 
for coin,” he did trade his conscience for a human being, Florens, whom he and D’Ortega 
valued at “twenty pieces of eight.”76 Jacob is completely unaware of his moral hypocrisy, 
and throughout the novel, he is able to reason with himself for each immoral act he 
commits in his quest for prosperity. Strehle states that “Jacob reflects the best traits and 
intentions of the American pioneer, particularly the commitment to finding his own way 
in the new land without falling into the corrupt practices that he associates with 
Europe”.77 Jacob embodies the paradox Morrison illustrates in Early America, rooted in 
notions of American exceptionalism, in which he is able to understand his actions, 
however hypocritical and corrupt, as validated by his compassionate nature and work 
ethic. Though as Jacob demonstrates, embodying distaste for cruelty and corruption is not 
paradoxical to his actions, but indeed becomes the reason he is able to forgive himself for 
them. 
                                                          
73




 Ibid., 33.  
76
 Ibid., 31.  
77
 “’I Am a Thing Apart’: Toni Morrison, A Mercy , and American Exceptionalism," 113.  
  39 
 
 The reason that Jacob Vaark is able to make an exception to his moral stance 
against slavery and trading “flesh as a commodity,” is representative of what Agamben 
designates as the “state of exception,” through which sovereign power operates, and the 
power of the law acts outside of the law.  Agamben writes that “the sovereign, having the 
legal power to suspend the validity of the law, legally places himself outside the law.”78 
In other words, sovereign power, or state power, is able to transgress the law, to make an 
“exception” that it is able to validate. An example of this sort of power is represented in 
our nation’s current moment through the death penalty, the killing of civilians by the 
police, or going to war---though killing another individual is unlawful, the state is able to 
transgress this law and kill under certain circumstances—a state of exception. Susan 
Strehle connects Agamben’s notion of the state of exception to the American 
exceptionalism illustrated in A Mercy, claiming that the state of exception operates when 
“a nation justifies suspending its laws in the interest of security,” and that “faith in the 
nation’s exceptional moral stance blinds U.S. citizens to the corruption of national ideals 
when the state makes exceptions to the rule.”79 This notion is reflected in A Mercy when 
the narrator explains how the slave codes were meant to “separate and protect all whites 
from all others forever.”80 The slave codes were understood to be for the protection of the 
colonists, and were therefore not acknowledged as immoral or corrupt.  
  The exception to the rule becomes the rule in biopolitics. Agamben reiterates that 
“all law is ‘situational law,’” and that the decision that is made under these situations or 
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“exceptions” illuminates state or sovereign authority.81 Jacob reveals this most acutely 
when he reasons with himself for accepting Florens, the slave girl, by recalling a similar 
situation a decade prior, in which “he found it hard to refuse when called on to rescue an 
unmoored, unwanted child”.82  This child is a girl named Sorrow, whom Jacob reasoned 
would provide much needed help for his wife, Rebekka on their property. Their sons died 
as young children, and she needed assistance with upkeep and labor. He accepted Sorrow 
from a sawyer who found her “half dead” on the shore, and “Jacob agreed to do it, 
provided the sawyer forgive the cost of the lumber he was buying.”83Though Jacob 
claims that “flesh” is not his “commodity,” in validating his decision to accept Florens 
for the repayment of a debt, the reader learns that he has already engaged in such 
practices before when accepting Sorrow. Jacob believes that the “acquisition of both 
[Florens and Sorrow] could be seen as a rescue”.84 Jacob also has another woman 
laboring on his farm named Lina, a Native American who was the “only” one that he had 
“purchased outright and deliberately,” implying her situation was different because “she 
was a woman, not a child”.85 Jacob does not realize that he is dealing in flesh, something 
he claims he has no respect for and would not become involved in, yet his sense of moral 
superiority blinds him from the fact that he deliberately participates in a business that he 
criticizes. Jacob’s story illustrates how in colonial America, “ideological dominance and 
hegemony were forming,” in what has been defined as a “contact zone,” or space before 
the “acceleration of the Atlantic slave trade” in which “competing imperialisms, 
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economic migrants, slaves, indentured European laborers, indigenous people, and 
religious exiles were vying to make the landscape of the new world legible in terms that 
claimed continuity with their prior Weltanschauung [world view].”86 Jacob is unable to 
notice his own participation within an inhumane system of corruption and oppression that 
he has attempted to avoid. He has merely made an “exception” by accepting these women 
for labor, so he does not see his own hypocrisy. Though Jacob understands his actions as 
merciful towards the women laboring on his property, he never considers them as whole, 
autonomous beings, nor does he consider repaying them for their labor.
87
 
 In A Mercy, Morrison represents the enslaved, black characters as homo sacer, as 
well as the Native Americans that have also been submitted to this form of oppression, 
but must follow the law of the colonists in the “new world”. Florens was offered by her 
mother to take her place, so that she would not be taken away from the young baby boy 
(Floren’s little brother) that she was still nursing. Florens’s mother also offers her up to 
take her place in the deal struck by D’Ortego and Jacob because she feels that Jacob is 
not as violent as her own master. Morrison writes during this scene, and repeats 
throughout the novel, that the white colonists were in the business of “authorizing chaos 
in defense of order,” as black slaves can be killed, raped, or punished without reason, 
however their owners see fit.
88
 This represents Agamben’s notion that the production of 
bare life is necessitated by the state to protect and support the individuals that hold 
political or social status—the chosen population that must be separated and protected. It 
is this separation that defines the subjectivity of those within the protection of the law and 
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society. Agamben writes that “exteriority—the law of nature and the principle of the 
preservation of one’s own life—is truly the innermost center of the political system.”89 
Florens’s mother understands the colonists’ reasoned violence and the slave’s status 
within the colonies, which is why she asks Jacob Vaark to take her daughter instead of 
herself, hoping that this man will provide a refuge for Florens, knowing that she and her 
daughter are merely “bare life” for the colonists. In this scene, Florens is described as a 
“raccoon baby stuck in a trap,” further emphasizing her dehumanized and captured state, 
while also referencing the moment Jacob dismounts his horse on his journey to D’ortega 
in order to rescue a raccoon stuck in a tree.
90
 The repeated image of the trapped raccoon 
draws attention to how Jacob’s own sense of moral superiority and compassion blinds 
him to his involvement in the slave business by accepting Florens to settle a debt. He 
believes himself to be a kind and compassionate individual, the kind who stops to help 
free a trapped animal, though he traps Florens, participating in the slave businesses, a fact 
that he is willfully ignorant of.  
 A Mercy illustrates the racialization of slavery and citizenship in the new world, 
while also demonstrating how all women are homo sacer figures, included in the state 
through their exclusion. It is for this reason that the separation and distancing of the 
women on the Vaark farm is particularly tragic: though at the beginning of the story, 
Rebekka, Lina, Florens, and Sorrow all share a sense of vulnerability and solidarity as 
women, by the end of the story, Rebekka asserts a sense of dominance and superiority, 
and the women become divided. Rebekka’s changing relationship with Lina, the Native 
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American woman Jacob purchased to help her, is perhaps most telling of her 
transformation and the division of this community of women.  Rebekka explains that her 
parents’ religious beliefs were “fueled by a wondrous hatred,” claiming that “Shallow 
believers preferred a shallow god,” understanding herself to be different and separate 
from this set of beliefs, much in the same way that Jacob understands himself to be 
morally superior to the colonists thriving in the growing slave business.
91
 At first, 
Rebekka is distrustful of Lina, clinging to racialized notions of “savage” Natives 
encouraged by her religious upbringing. Rebekka remembers that she “bolted the door at 
night and would not let the raven-haired girl with impossible skin sleep anywhere near.”92 
Rebekka explains that over time, “perhaps because they were both alone without family, 
or because both had to please one man [Jacob], or because both were ignorant of how to 
run a farm, they became what was for each a companion.”93 It is when Rebekka gives 
birth to her first baby boy that dies, that she comes to trust Lina fully. Rebekka 
reminisces that “when the first infant was born, Lina handled it so tenderly, with such 
knowing,” that she was “ashamed of her early fears and pretended she never had them.”94 
Rebekka forms a bond with Lina and is able to assuage herself of any guilt. However, for 
a time, both women, as well as all of the women on the farm, are able to be companions 
to each other.  
 Rebekka recounts her life before coming to the New World, and the women she 
met and bonded with on her passage to explain her sense of compassion and solidarity 
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with other women, regardless of class or racial differences. Rebekka’s father in essence 
sold her to Jacob to be his wife, as Jacob was in search of a “healthy, chaste wife willing 
to travel abroad,” and was willing to “reimburse” the family for traveling and clothing 
expeses.
95
 Rebekka relates a lack of choice in the matter, though came to terms with it as 
“her prospects were servant, prostitute, wife, and although horrible stories were told 
about each of those careers, the last one seemed safest.”96 Rebekka, like Jacob, views the 
new world as an opportunity for a different life than she would have had in England, 
while being fully aware of her status as a homo sacer type figure, due to her gender. 
Strehle explains that “Like her husband, Rebekka has no nostalgia for London, which she 
recalls as a place of hatred, discomfort, and narrow-mindedness; while he [Jacob] is 
literally an orphan, she has been figuratively sold by her parents to the first man who 
would pay her passage.”97 Rebekka can experience a sense of compassion and solidarity 
with Lina and the other women on the farm, as women are similar in many ways. This is 
emphasized by the fact that Rebekka was also “sold” to Jacob. During her passage to the 
states, Rebekka was a young girl all alone, taken in by the prostitutes and lower class 
women on the ship. They provided her with a safe space and a feeling of community, and 
it is this experience that forms her sensitivity to the specific oppressions that all women 
have in common. Rebekka looks back fondly on her memories with the women on the 
ship, understanding them, and herself included, as “Women of and for men,” though in 
their moments of fellowship, “they were neither.”98 Rebekka carries this sense of 
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solidarity she experiences with the prostitutes on the ship to her relationship with the 
women laboring on her farm. Rebekka relates that “although they had nothing in common 
with the views of each other, they had everything in common with one thing: the promise 
and threat of men.”99 Agamben explains that all beings in a biopolitical system are homo 
sacer, regardless of class standing or race, because all “human life is included in the 
political order in being exposed to an unconditional capacity to be killed.”100 While all 
individuals in the new world can be seen as homo sacer, Rebekka and the other women 
are made acutely aware of this status as women who exist at the expense of men.   
 After her husband Jacob dies and Rebekka herself falls dangerously ill, she joins a 
religious sect she once criticized, and begins treating the other women, and especially 
Lina, as beneath her. Rebekka overlooks her solidarity and similar status with these 
women, and commits herself to an ideology of racial superiority; validated by a belief 
that she is part of god’s chosen people. Scully, an indentured servant on the Vaark’s farm, 
notices this shift in Rebekka’s worldview, explaining that “She was a penitent, pure and 
simple. Which to him meant that underneath her piety was something cold, if not 
cruel.”101 Like Jacob, Rebekka’s sense of piety and moral superiority blind her to her own 
acts of cruelty and oppression. Though Lina is devoted to her throughout her illness, 
practicing her own medicinal techniques to help heal her, once Rebekka recovers, she 
credits God for her healing, and prohibits Lina from her cultural practices, makes her cut 
her hair, and forces her to accompany Rebekka to church services, though she is not 
allowed to enter the building. Rebekka also plans to sell Florens and Sorrow. These 
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changes in Rebekkah’s beliefs and actions “are significant because, although she has 
expressed a feminist understanding of the plight of women under patriarchal 
oppression…she now betrays all of the women who have formed her community,” and in 
doing so, sells her integrity and plans to sell her female companions in order to fit in with 
the racist Anabaptists.
102
 Rebekka’s change of heart and treatment of the other women on 
her farm represents the roots of white feminism: she forgoes her compassion and 
solidarity for all women, participating in racial hierarchy for her own benefit, viewing 
lower class women and women of color as beneath her and her own concerns as a 
woman. Not only does she treat Lina with contempt, but she begins to beat Sorrow as 
well. Morrison writes that “the family they imagined they had become was false.”103  
 The narratives of Jacob and Rebekka Vaark illustrate the formation of division 
that a biopolitical system necessitates. The organization of racial hierarchy forms in the 
New World due to such systematic necessities, while the white colonists are able to 
validate the inhumane acts they commit to satisfy their own needs. Rebekka and Jacob 
partake in the very type of hierarchical system they each claim to condemn, but are not 
able to see how they have constructed their subjectivities and way of being in support of 
such systems. They fail to “understand that their presence and the settlements to which 
they belong are forged in violence,” nor that they presence and new life means the end of 
an existence that Lina, and other Native Americans once knew.
104
 Their willing 
participation in the business of slavery and the belief in their own moral superiority 
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illustrate how they become fully imbedded in such systems of violence and oppression. 
Rebekka in particular comes to focus on the differences between herself and the other 
women rather than their similarities, as she once did. She participates in a system that 
organizes functions to organize these women hierarchically, rather than continue to notice 
their similar status as women who embody homo sacer, and can be reduced to bare life 
under patriarchy.  
Bare Life and the Law in Home 
 In Home, Morrison explores racism and violence in the Unites States in the late 
1950’s, a time that is often portrayed with nostalgia in cultural productions and by right-
wing politicians. By doing so, she demonstrates how, as Keeanga-Yamahtta Taylor writes 
in From #BlackLivesMatter to Black Liberation, “Race and racism have not been 
exceptions; instead, they have been the glue that hold the United States together.”105 The 
racialization of crime, the black codes, and class and race targeted laws such as 
“vagrancy” laws that Taylor outlines in her sociological and historical survey of race, 
inequality, and mass incarceration, are historical truths illustrated in Home. In Morrison’s 
1994 article, “On the Backs of Blacks,” she writes that “There is virtually no movement 
up—for blacks or whites, established classes or arrivistes—that is not accompanied by 
race talk. Refusing, negotiating, or fulfilling this demand is the real stuff, the organizing 
principle of becoming an American. Star-spangled. Race-Strangled.”106 This concept is 
represented by the novel’s protagonist, Frank, and his sister, Cee. Frank and Cee both 
portray how black Americans are reduced to “bare life,” or represent homo sacer figures, 
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explicitly so during the Jim Crow era preceding the civil rights movement. This is a time 
often defined by the growth of the middle-class in the United States, after slavery had 
ended and African Americans could begin to move up in socioeconomic status. Frank and 
Cee’s stories illustrate how this mythologized past is not accurate to the struggles that 
those of color faced then, and still face now. In the 25
th
 Jefferson Lecture in the 
Humanities given by Morrison in 1996 entitled, “The Future of Time: Literature and 
Diminished Expectations,” she speaks of the American political practice of glorifying the 
past, noting that “The fifties, the current favorite, has acquired a gloss of voluntary 
orderliness, of ethnic harmony, although it was a decade of outrageous political and 
ethnic persecution. And here one realizes that the dexterity of political language is 
stunning, stunning and shameless.”107 The stories of Frank and his sister Cee in Home 
function to portray the “outrageous political and ethnic persecution” Morrison relates 
above, while also illustrating the way black Americans during this time are included in 
the American state through their exclusion—representing the law of exteriority that 
Agamben outlines in his analysis of homo sacer and biopolitics.  
 Frank Money’s narrative demonstrates how black men, specifically during the 
1950’s, constitute what Agamben designates as homo sacer, or life that can be killed with 
impunity. Agamben claims that the “fundamental biopolitical structure of modernity” 
centers on the “decision on the value (or nonvalue) of life as such,” while sovereign 
power, wielded by the state, holds charge over this decision.
108
 From the beginning of the 
novel, Frank is made to confront the notion that his life as a black man is not valued, and 
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can in fact be killed without consequence. The opening scene of Home is a childhood 
flashback memory written in italics, depicting Frank and Cee as children hiding in a field, 
watching white men ride up on horses to bury the body of a black man after a lynching. 
Frank narrates, “we saw them pull a body from a wheelbarrow and throw it into a hole 
already waiting.”109 One of the first memories Frank can recall from his childhood is this 
scene of a black body being discarded carelessly. Frank relates to the reader in recounting 
this memory, “I really forgot about the burial. I only remembered the horses. They were 
so beautiful. So brutal. And they stood like men.”110 The horses “stood like men,” while a 
black body was being dumped into a make-shift grave dug in a farm field. Candice L. 
Pipes writes that “The burial demonstrates the reality of the Jim Crow governed 
South….the horses were more like men than black men were like men.”111 The 
juxtaposition of these two images demonstrates that the horses are treated with more 
dignity and respect than black men. Frank’s narration of this flashback depicts that he 
understands this, yet he does not want to acknowledge it outright, detailing the power and 
stature of the horses rather than the dehumanized state of the discarded black body. This 
scene represents how black men in the Jim Crow South could be reduced to bare life, 
demonstrating a political state in which subjective identification is realized through the 
exclusion and destruction of the Other.
112
 This opening scene illustrates the value, or 
rather the nonvalue of black men’s lives while reflecting the violent biopolitical binary 
Agamben outlines.  
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 Frank’s story begins in the northern United States while he is traveling back to his 
home in Lotus, GA after fighting in the Korean War. He is arrested because he had 
“swerved his head wildly to see where he was going,” and institutionalized in the mental 
health ward of a hospital, where he has been sedated.
113
 Frank awakes in the hospital, 
plotting his escape, but cannot find a pair of shoes, the omniscient narrator telling the 
reader that “Walking anywhere in winter without shoes would guarantee his being 
arrested and back in the ward until he could be sentenced for vagrancy.”114 Frank’s arrest 
for moving his head quickly and the mention of vagrancy laws references how black men 
are separated from the rest of the population, and heavily policed. It also demonstrates a 
northern United States that is not that much better for black Americans than the Jim Crow 
South. Morrison writes, “Interesting law, vagrancy, meaning standing outside or walking 
without clear purpose, anywhere.”115 Frank is arrested for making a sudden movement, 
and he understands that he would likely be arrested again for walking outside without 
shoes. He has already been medically sedated because the innocent action that prompted 
his arrest was seen as threatening. This scene stands in sharp contrast to the opening 
scene of the burial flashback, in which a black man was lynched and the police were 
nowhere to be seen. Taylor explains that during this time, in the North as well as the 
South, there were state regulations known as the “black codes,” a series “laws, rules, and 
restrictions imposed only on African Americans” which “criminalized poverty, 
movement, and even leisure. Blacks could be arrested for vaguely worded or innocuous 
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‘crimes’ such as ‘vagrancy’.”116 Frank’s run-in with the law at the beginning of his story, 
illustrating the black codes Taylor outlines, demonstrates how the state functions to 
protect white citizens, while African Americans receive no such protection, and are in 
fact terrorized by the police in the interest of protecting whites. The narrator states that 
“better than most, he [Frank] knew that being outside wasn’t necessary for legal or illegal 
disruption,” as “men with or without badges, but always with guns could force you, your 
family, your neighbors to pack and move.”117 This claustrophobic scene of Frank plotting 
his escape from the hospital seems to parallel the notion of being trapped or suffocated by 
the state anywhere he goes.   
 Once Frank escapes the hospital and finds shelter for the night from Reverend 
John Locke, he learns that being arrested is not the worst thing that could have happened 
had he not escaped. When Reverend Locke learns that Frank has escaped the hospital, he 
tells him, “You lucky, Mr. Money. They sell a lot of bodies out there.”118 Frank is 
shocked by this suggestion, to which Reverend Locke responds, “Well, you know, 
doctors need to work on the dead poor so they can help the rich live.”119 This shocking 
insight demonstrates how black bodies and poor bodies can be reduced to bare life for the 
benefit of privileged citizens, while also foreshadowing what happens to Frank’s sister 
Cee. Agamben explains that in a biopolitical system, the biological health of citizens 
becomes the state’s concern, and the institution of medicine becomes intertwined with 
economics and the needs of the state, “Hence the radical transformation of the meaning 
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and duties of medicine, which is increasingly integrated into the functions and the organs 
of the state…”120 Doctors and the state are able to make decisions about bare life based 
on the needs of the state, which is why Reverend Locke tells Frank that the bodies of the 
poor are used as bare life for the benefit of more privileged citizens. Agamben’s analysis 
uses the Third Reich and concentration camp as the basis of his interrogation, claiming 
that it is only through understanding the biopolitical structure that works to benefit the 
health of the chosen population of citizens that one can grasp the Third Reich’s project, in 
which the harvesting and extinguishing of the Jewish body was for the benefit of the 
German, or European body.
121
 Though Agamben’s analysis focuses on a different 
historical phenomenon, applying his concepts to the depictions of the treatment of people 
of color and poor people in Home demonstrates a similar relationship between bodies and 
the state that Agamben examines occurring in the novel. This brings about some cogent 
questions and insights into certain state structures and historical phenomenon in the 
United States that Morrison’s novel gestures to.   
 Frank stops next in Chicago on his journey back home to Georgia, and what he 
learns from the family he stays with while there further disproves the notion that 
Northern states were much better or safer for African Americans than the South. He 
notices that the family’s small boy has a crooked arm and the father, Billy, tells him that 
a policeman shot his son while he was driving by. He tells Frank that the boy was eight 
years old and had been playing outside with a toy gun when “Some redneck rookie 
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thought his dick was underappreciated by his brother cops.”122 When Frank responds, 
“You can’t just shoot a kid,” the boy’s father, Billy, tells him that “Cops shoot anything 
they want. This here’s a mob city.”123 This is an example of how the black characters in 
home are depicted as what Agamben defines as figures reduced to a state of bare life. 
Using the Third Reich as a primary example, Agamben explains how in such a 
biopolitical system, “the only real question to be decided was which form of organization 
would be best suited to the task of assuring the care, control, and use of bare life.”124 
Heavy policing and police brutality are an example of the state’s attempt to “control” 
bare life for the benefit and protection of valued and privileged citizens. Taylor explains 
why relations between the police and the poor, and people of color have always been 
fraught with injustice and violence. She writes that “The police function to enforce the 
rule of the politically powerful and economic elite,” which is why “poor and working 
class communities are so heavily police,” leading her to point out that “if the task of the 
police is to maintain law and order, then that role takes on a specific meaning in a 
fundamentally racist society.”125 The fact that a child is seen as threatening enough for a 
policeman to shoot abruptly illustrates the extent to which racism is imbedded in the 
biopolitical state apparatus of the 1950’s America depicted in Home. Later when Frank is 
mugged in Atlanta during his journey home, a man asks if he wants to call the police, and 
Frank responds, “Hell no,” understanding that he cannot rely on them for protection, and 
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in fact, may be found suspicious himself.
126
The man who asks if he needs help tells Frank 
to “Stay in the light” in order to keep safe.127 This illustrates the binary between bare life 
that is excluded from the body of the state, and the politically invested life of citizens that 
Agamben delineates in Homo Sacer.  
  The metaphor of war extends throughout the novel. Frank is a returned soldier 
who is illustrated fighting another war back in the United States as a black man in a racist 
nation. The war flashbacks, which could in this day and age be labeled as PTSD, 
emphasize the constant state of war in which Frank finds himself. It is notable that Frank 
has returned from the Korean War, and Morrison’s “allusions make clear that the period 
after the World Wars can hardly be regarded as having healed the old fissures in a 
postwar peace.”128 Frank is a veteran who fought for a state power that does not 
recognize his humanity. Candice L. Pipes notes that the reality for black soldiers 
returning from the World Wars and the Korean War was a “Jim Crow, segregated 
society, which still allowed public lynchings of black people,” and Frank’s experiences in 
the North detail that the region does not have much more to offer, and though the North is 
not defined by lynchings during this era, police brutality and killings can be seen as 
another form of lynching.
129
 Pipes continues to note that “The untold story is that even as 
black soldiers were fighting for the United States of America, for democracy, for their 
own respect and dignity, for their humanity, the roots of institutionalized racism were 
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being dug even deeper.”130 Frank returns to a Unites States in which racism is thriving, 
and the fact that he is a veteran does not ease the danger or conflict that surrounds him. 
 Frank expresses a hope in the notion that fighting in the war might provide 
opportunity or help him gain acknowledgment and respect, or an avenue towards a 
different life entirely. He finds his hometown of Lotus, GA unbearable due to “It’s 
unforgiving population, its isolation, and its indifference to the future…”131 Frank goes to 
war to escape his home, along with his two best friends. Morrison writes that when Frank 
tried to explain to Cee why he chose to go to war, “He tried to tell her the army was the 
only solution. Lotus was suffocating, killing him and his two best friends. They all 
agreed.”132 Even after Frank returns home from the awful things he witnesses in battle, a 
section of Frank’s internal dialogue, written in italics, reiterates, “Lotus, Georgia, is the 
worst place in the world, worse than any battlefield. At least on the field there is a goal, 
excitement, daring, some chance of winning along with many chances of losing.”133 Frank 
intentionally places himself in a war, in a situation where he is merely bare life, because 
at least in battle, he feels he can fight, where as in Lotus, he feels stagnant in an 
environment where he is made to be bare life—it is not a choice he can make. War can be 
viewed as a sort of “state of exception” that Agamben describes, in which violence is 
prohibited. He describes this kind of biopolitical structure as one where “Bare life is no 
longer confined to a particular place or a definite category. It now dwells in the biological 
body of every living being,” implying that this is also true in modern democratic state 
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structures—the state of exception and bare life are not confined to the space of the 
concentration camp, or in this case, a war.
134
 Franks experiences at war and at home are 
compared to each other, illustrating Agamben’s conception of biopolitics and bare life.  
 Frank was exposed to what Agamben defines as bare life while at war, and he 
constantly battles the memories of the atrocities he witnessed. The violence and racial 
policing he witnessed after returning from war trigger memories of fighting in Korea, 
implying connection or comparison between the two spaces. He remembers witnessing a 
starving young Korean girl being killed by a solider. It is only later in the story that he 
realizes that he was the solider that shot this girl, a memory that he had repressed. The 
girl was searching through trash looking for food, eventually grabbing the solder’s crotch 
saying “Yum Yum,” and the soldier, whom later is revealed to be Frank himself, “blows 
her away.”135 Frank recalls that “Thinking back on it now, I think the guard felt more than 
disgust. I think he felt tempted and that is what he had to kill.”136 Frank cannot handle the 
truth that he killed this girl, and his memory of how his friend died in battle, in which he 
had to locate his friend’s blown-off limb, parallels when he had “blown away” the young 
Korean girl. When Frank travels through Atlanta he has a flashback of watching his two 
best friends die in battle, stating that “Now they were meat.”137 Frank partakes of this act 
of violence, treating an individual as bare life while he is in battle. He partakes in the 
same form of violence that he witnesses in back home in America. Penner claims that 
Frank “acknowledges being plagued not only by social ills he cannot control but also by 
                                                          
134
 Homo Sacer, 140.  
135
 Home, 95.  
136
 Ibid., 96.  
137
 Ibid., 99.  
  57 
 
his participation in them,” his inability to recognize that he is the soldier that killed the 
Korean girl is an attempt to obscure the reality that “he, too, uses familiar cultural tropes 
to ease his own acts of brutality during the war.”138 He  partakes in the system of 
biopolitics by killing soldiers in battle and killing the Korean girl, in a space that can be 
defined as a state of exception- war. Agamben reiterates that it is “this topological zone 
of indistinction, which had to remain hidden from the eyes of justice, that we must try to 
fix under our gaze.”139 The state in which Frank finds Cee after returning home forces 
him to confront such acts of violence against bare life, since Cee herself has been reduced 
to bare life.  
 Frank travels home after receiving word from a stranger that Cee is ill and in 
danger. He is traveling through suburbs outside of Atlanta to locate Cee at the address 
provided on the letter he received. Morrison writes that “finding transportation in these 
parts was rougher than confronting a battlefield,” which again references the war 
metaphor, implicating that Frank is entering into another such space.
140
 Frank’s sister Cee 
goes to work as a housekeeper for a doctor, and ends up being essentially used as a lab rat 
so he could conduct experiments on her reproductive organs. Cee is treated as bare life, 
being harvested for the service of the designated collection of valued citizens, which 
mirrors Reverend Locke’s comments about doctor’s needing to “work on the dead poor 
to help the rich live.”141 Cee’s status as “bare life” is what keeps Frank from reporting the 
doctor to the police, knowing that black men and women are killed for whatever reason, 
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and that the law will not help them in any way, as it exists for and by the white 
community.  When Frank arrives to take his sister from Dr. Beau, the doctor does not 
care to stop him. Morrison writes that for Dr. Beau, Frank taking back his sister was “Just 
the kidnapping of an employee he could easily replace,” reinforcing Cee’s status as a 
poor black woman in the American South at the time, viewed as bare life for the use of 
the designated population of citizens.
142Cee’s status is reflective of the harvesting of the 
bodies of Jews in the concentration camps that Agamben references in his analysis of 
biopolitics. He states that it is “Only from this perspective is it possible to grasp the full 
sense of the extermination of the Jews, in which the police and politics, eugenic motives 
and ideological motives, the care of the health and fight against the enemy become 
absolutely indistinguishable.”143The state of exception becomes the rule in a biopolitical 
state structure, and Cee’s status as bare life, being used as a lab rat for the “care of the 
health” of the valued population of citizens, exposes binary of bare life and citizen 
illustrated throughout the novel.  
 Frank delivers Cee to a group of elderly black women that had helped to raise 
them as children. These women take it upon themselves to bring Cee back to health, not 
trusting the medical institution or any other—she must be healed by a group of women 
away from such spaces. Much in the same way that Frank did involve the authorities with 
Dr. Beau, these women do not trust such institutions, learning to work outside of them. 
Morrison writes that “The women handled sickness as though it were an affront, an 
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illegal, invading braggart who needed whipping.”144 When he takes her to Miss Ethel’s 
house, the women are not surprised to hear of what happened when learning that Cee was 
working for a doctor. They berate her for working for a doctor in the first place and not 
knowing better, saying, “Men know a slop jar when they see one,” “You ain’t a mule to 
be pulling some evil doctor’s wagon,” and “Who told you you was trash?”.145 This 
environment is a sharp contrast to the experiences Frank has after returning from war, in 
which he is isolated and always on his guard. Cee has a community apart from any state 
structure to be healed and taken care of. These women have had to find develop their own 
methods of healing and care, establishing their own way of being, while Frank did the 
opposite by going away to war and imbedding himself in the very state system that is the 
source of his trauma and oppression. Frank must confront the “Realities of race, of 
traumatic stress, of guilt and shame, of segregation and disreception, of invisibility…”146 
Frank’s experiences at war and at home, and Cee’s experience “working” for Dr. Beau, 
both delineate the extent to which violence in predicated and validated in a biopolitical 
system, that makes exceptions in order to care for the life of valued citizens.  
Conclusion 
 Both A Mercy and Home revisit periods of American history that are often 
mythologized. Morrison is able to illustrate systems of divisions, violence, and 
oppression at the root of the American state system, and explores how the subjectivities 
of those living with such a system are impacted. Agamben’s analysis of biopolitics is 
helpful in delineating the structures of power and citizenship depicted in each novel, and 
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the novels function to provide an expanded illustration of Agamben’s interrogation of 
biopolitics. These novels illustrate what Agamben recognizes as the “fundamental 
biopolitical fracture within itself [the division or separation within the system itself, that 
which cannot be included],” which is “what always is and yet must, nevertheless, be 
realized; it is the pure source of every identity but must, however, continually be 
redefined and purified through exclusion, language, blood, land.”147 Biopolitical 
structures function on a binary of bare life and citizen, and although biopolitics aims at all 
body politics (because even the citizens are to be subject to the norm of the body, like the 
healthy body), it is in regards to bare life that the sovereign state’s structural or 
foundational violence becomes visible. In each novel, the characters struggle to construct 
their subjectivities in reaction to, or as a part of such a system. Keeanga-Yamahtta Taylor 
writes, the “Black experience unravels what we are supposed to know to be true about 
America itself—the land of milk and honey—the land where had work makes dreams 
come true,” while this mythology serves the United States in validating its decisions for 
intervention and violent action in the interest of caring for its valued citizens.
148
 A Mercy 
illustrates a space where such divisions begin to take place during the formation of the 
American state, while Home demonstrates the impact of such divisions and the logics of 
the state of exception that validates them, after such ideologies have thrived.  
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CHAPTER 3: RACE AND THE RUPTURED SUBJECT IN THE BLUEST EYE AND 
BELOVED  
Introduction 
 Toni Morrison’s work challenges the reader to rethink the history of race and 
racism in the United States, and how each individual participates in and maintains such 
oppressive social and political structures. Her work explores the ways that subjects either 
adhere to, or “wake up” from what Lacan defines as the fantasy reality that is founded 
upon racial, gender, and sexual oppressions that signify the source of trauma for each 
character in her novels. Illustrating how the traumatic history of slavery persists as a facet 
of black consciousness and reality, and by writing the internal dialogues of each 
character, Morrison explores the desires, conscious and unconscious, of the oppressed 
and the oppressors in each narrative. Morrison maintains the belief that “Literature, 
sensitive as a tuning fork, is an unblinking witness to the light and shade of the world we 
live in,” and her work can be understood as an “unblinking witness” to racial violence, 
history, and trauma—phenomenon that have often been silenced, or barely acknowledged 
within the dominant narrative of the United States.
149
 Many of Morrison’s novels detail 
the treacherous and violent impacts of racism on the lives of women color. Evelyn Jaffe 
Schreiber explains that Morrison’s work delineates notions of the self and home, telling 
stories of African American trauma, illustrating how subjects struggle to construct 
identities and a sense of self in a racist, patriarchal society.
150
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 The characters in Morrison’s novels illustrate Lacan’s notion of the ruptured 
subject or subject of lack, a concept upon which Lacanian theorist Joan Copjec 
foregrounds her work. Copjec identifies a void at the center of racial identity, and this 
theoretical understanding provides a necessary framework for interpreting Morrison’s 
fiction.
151
 The characters in Morrison’s novels also provide potent illustrations of 
Copjec’s Lacanian understanding of racial and feminine identity as founded on an 
inherent rupture, and may even expand upon Copjec’s intellectual work. Copjec’s focus 
on the subject’s rupturing, in terms of conceiving racial and feminine identity, are 
particularly useful to exploring how Morrison foregrounds the construction of 
subjectivity in her novels. The Bluest Eye and Beloved provide particularly impactful 
depictions of racial trauma and subjectivity. In The Bluest Eye, all of the black characters, 
especially the character of focus, Pecola Breedlove, are constantly aware of their race and 
racial history. Pecola falls apart under the weight of her traumatic experience as the ugly, 
dark black girl, rejected by everyone around her and raped by her own father, Cholly 
Breedlove. Every character in The Bluest Eye, not just Pecola, illustrates the Lacanian 
notion of a ruptured subject. Pecola lacks the community or support to conceive of 
herself as an individual worthy of love and care, which is ultimately the reason for her 
undoing. In Beloved, the protagonist Sethe also faces personal violence and trauma, 
though she can be interpreted as a character that is able to make a decision outside of the 
fantasmatic realm of subjectivity and reality when she kills her baby to protect her from a 
life of slavery. Such an autonomous and self-defining action is a notion that Copjec 
analyzes through Lacan’s reading of the story of Antigone. Sethe also has Paul D., an old 
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friend who was also enslaved at the plantation she escaped, and they each serve as a 
witness to the other’s trauma. At the center of both novels is a concern with personal and 
collective healing that must begin with the subject’s restoration.  
The Ruptured Subject and the Cycle of Violence in The Bluest Eye 
 In Imagine There’s No Woman, Copjec begins her analysis of feminine 
subjectivity, sublimation, and ethics, by noting why it is that human beings are inherently 
ruptured, and why achieving a complete state of being is not possible. She claims, “it is 
thought that makes an all of being impossible,” clarifying that what she means is “not that 
we cannot think the all of being, but that there is none.”152 It is our capacity for conscious 
thought that divides up our being, and the reason why we are predicated by a sense of 
lack, causing us to search elsewhere to gain a sense of completeness, which is a futile 
mission. This traumatic rupture and sense of lack occurs when the subject enters the 
world of language in the Symbolic Order. Our capacity to recognize our individual status 
and difference from others and the world around us causes us to compare ourselves to the 
external world, and seek outside the self for what seems to be missing. Copjec is 
criticizing the duality suggested by Descartes’s statement, “I think therefore I am,” to 
demonstrate that it is actually because we think that we are not complete. Copjec explains 
that Lacan’s reading of the story of Antigone, in which he determines Antigone to be 
autonomous and ethical by defying Creon in breaking the law to bury her brother, 
provides a “glimpse of the difference between psychoanalysis and philosophy or 
psychology,” as Lacan “does not read the behavior of each of the protagonists, he defines 
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the structure through which their acts must be read.”153  It is this sort of psychoanalytic 
lens that provides an avenue of inquiry into the structures that predicate the actions and 
responses of Pecola, Cholly, and the other characters in The Bluest Eye.  
 The beginning of the novel, written in italics as the inner dialogue of Claudia, a 
child who befriends Pecola, immediately references the sense of impotence that these 
young girls, and the whole community feels. Claudia relates, that “there were no 
marigolds in the fall of 1941,” and she and her sister Frieda “thought, at the time, that it 
was because Pecola was having her father’s baby that the marigolds did not grow,” then 
explaining that “A little examination and much less melancholy would have proved to us 
that our seeds were not the only ones that did not sprout; nobody’s did.”154 Morrison 
incites the whole community into Pecola’s hardship, while also demonstrating how these 
characters feel powerless, yet are focused on their own individual lack of autonomy or 
impotence, failing to recognize that the entire community is disenfranchised. Morrison 
closes this opening section of Claudia’s internal dialogue with her assessment that “There 
is really nothing more to say—except why. But since why is difficult to handle, one must 
take refuge in how.”155 This statement of inquiry incites the framework or lens of analysis 
that Copjec defines as psychoanalysis, as the structure in which actions occur, not merely 
the actions themselves, are interpreted. Morrison asks the reader to inquire into “how,” 
not “why,” Pecola’s tragic story unfolds as it does. Again, Morrison incites community 
responsibility and an interrogation of the oppressive systems in place that foreground 
what happens to Pecola. Stephanie Li claims that although it is easy to determine the 
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effects of societal inequality, violence, and oppression as resulting in the “psychological 
bondage” of an individual or group of people, this simplistic narrative disregards 
enduring structures of social inequality.
156
 Rather than analyze why Pecola succumbs to 
trauma and rejection, or why the community rejects her to begin with, and why her father 
Cholly abuses her, it is more fruitful to look at how such events occurred, and interrogate 
the environment that fosters this violence.  
 From the moment the reader is first introduced to Pecola, her status as an outcast 
is obvious. This is only emphasized by the structure of the novel, as much of it is narrated 
by a young girl named Claudia, who, along with her older sister, Frieda, befriends Pecola 
when their family takes her in for a short time. Pecola’s father Cholly, an alcoholic 
known for his outbursts of temper, had set fire to the Breedloves home, leaving his family 
“outdoors”.157 Claudia explains that the “real terror of life” was the “outdoors,” noting 
that “If you are put out, you go somewhere else; if you are outdoors, there is no place to 
go. The distinction was subtle but final. Outdoors was the end of something, an 
irrevocable, physical fact, defining and complementing our metaphysical condition.”158 
While Claudia tells the reader that Pecola is “outdoors,” she then continues to explain 
that the outdoors is “our metaphysical condition,” implicating herself and Frieda, and 
perhaps the whole community, as being cast out or rejected. Claudia says that she and 
Frieda enjoyed having Pecola over for that short time, making an effort to “keep her from 
feeling outdoors,” particularly after they “discovered that she clearly did not want to 
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dominate us.”159 The ego-boost of being the more dominant girls around Pecola made 
them accepting of her. Zizek explains that the Freudian concept of the “ideal ego,” 
represents “the idealized self-image of the subject (the way I would like to be, the way I 
would like others to see me).”160 It is Claudia and Frieda’s “ideal ego” that is bolstered by 
being around Pecola, and though they do become friends with her, it is made clear from 
the beginning that they ultimately do so for the boost in self-esteem.  
  The Breedloves are very dark, very poor, and have a dysfunctional family. As 
such, they are the pariahs of their community in Lorain, Ohio. The family lives in an old 
abandoned storefront, isolated from residential areas of town. Morrison writes that  
“they lived there because they were poor and black, and they stayed there because they 
believed they were ugly,” though their poverty was “traditional and stultifying,” their 
ugliness was distinctive, and the community paid them no mind.
161
 They seem to have 
accepted the position designated for them by the community as unlovable outcasts and 
unworthy individuals, ignored by the world around them. Morrison writes that besides 
Cholly Breedlove “whose ugliness (the result of despair, dissipation, and violence 
directed towards petty things and weak people) was behavior,” the rest of the family: the 
mother Pauline, and two children, Pecola and Sammy their ugliness “came from 
conviction. It was as though some mysterious all-knowing master had given each one a 
cloak of ugliness to wear, and they had each accepted it without question.”162 They play 
the role that the oppressive white culture has placed upon them. Copjec explains that “In 
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shame, unlike guilt, one experience’s one’s visibility, but there is no external Other who 
sees, since shame is proof that the Other does not exist.”163 When the subject feels shame, 
she no longer experiences herself as the “fulfillment of the Other’s desire,” which causes 
a “distance to open up within the subject herself.”164 The Breedloves seem to accept their 
ugliness as an act of shame, as they are not fulfilling the big Other’s desire—they do not 
see themselves as serving a purpose in the master narrative, which throws this narrative 
and any notions of a big Other or some “greater” purpose into question. Schrieber 
explains that the “black trauma” of being rendered invisible or lacking value as people in 
(white) dominant culture creates a “psychic struggle” to rise above this casted position 
and become a self that is worthy of respect and acknowledgement.
165
 The Breedloves are 
depicted as a group that feels shame, and has accepted their status as lesser than that is 
place upon them by the community that ignores their struggles. Copjec reiterates that the 
“subject is the product of history without being the fulfillment of a historical demand.”166 
The Breedloves poignantly illustrate this facet of subjectivity.  
 Pecola understands that her color is what is keeping her from being loved and 
accepted, and longs for the blue eyes of Shirley Temple, believing this will solve all of 
her problems and the rejection she experiences. Morrison writes that Pecola prayed for 
blue eyes every night and was “Thrown, in this way, into the binding conviction that only 
a miracle could relieve her, she would never know her beauty. She would only see what 
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there was to see: the eyes of other people.”167 Pecola is consumed by the belief that a 
change in her external appearance will grant her a sense of wholeness and self-hood. 
While it is true that much of her rejection and struggle comes from her status as a poor, 
black girl, applying a Lacanian lens to this belief reveals that a change in symbolic 
appearance will not grant one a sense of wholeness, as this is not possible. Sheldon 
George argues that race is a “fantasy difference,” and that the plight of people of color, 
and cycles of trauma in communities of color will not go away by focusing on changing 
signification, one must “move beyond signification,” rather than cling to it.168 Of course, 
this is nearly impossible to imagine in a world and society predicated on signification and 
the Symbolic Order. Morrison writes that for Pecola, “All things in her are flux and 
anticipation. But her blackness is static and dread. And it is the blackness that accounts 
for, that creates, the vacuum edged with distaste in white eyes.”169 Pecola berates herself 
for not being white, as if this is why she is lacking as a subject. She pities herself for not 
being enough (light). Copjec explains that the subject’s superego berates her with guilt 
for not living up to impossible, imaginary ideals that are imposed upon her.
170
 Pecola is a 
character who illustrates the cruel force of the superego upon the subject, longing for blue 
eyes and whiteness that she cannot possess.  
    Pecola wishes to embody white characteristics so badly, that she undergoes 
what Lacan defines as a self-rupturing experience of excess pleasure, or jouissance when 
she purchases Mary Jane candies. She notes the character of Mary Jane on the wrapper, 
                                                          
167
 The Bluest Eye, 46-47.  
168
Trauma and Race: A Lacanian study of African American Racial Identity, 36.   
169
 The Bluest Eye, 49.  
170
 Imagine There’s No Woman, 9.  
  69 
 
with her white skin, blonde hair, and blue eyes, “blue eyes looking at her out of a world 
of clean comfort.”171 To Pecola, this Mary Jane, like Shirley Temple, illustrates the 
epitome of a happy, pretty, loveable girl. She treasures these candies, savoring each bite 
as if “To eat the candy is somehow to eat the eyes, eat Mary Jane. Love Mary Jane. Be 
Mary Jane.”172 Copjec delineates how the experience of jouissance  or excess pleasure, 
much like the subject’s entering into the symbolic order, is predicated by the subject’s 
being internally split. She explains the Freudian notion of narcissism that is involved in 
any experience of loving another or an object, stating that when we love something 
external to ourselves, “what we love in the object is ourselves,” and that “in the 
jouissance of loving it affords a corporeal experience of the self.”173 The Mary Jane 
candies allow Pecola to access this jouissnace and experience an embodied selfhood 
through a self-rupturing excess or pleasure. Morrison writes that “Three little pennies had 
purchased her nine lovely orgasms with Mary Jane,” emphasizing the excessive pleasure 
Pecola experiences by consuming Mary Jane.
174
 It also demonstrates that Pecola does see 
herself in this character of Mary Jane to a degree. Sheldon George claims that “race and 
racism are modes of jouissance,” and the reader can see Pecola tapping into this notion by 
the jouissance she experiences while consuming the character of Mary Jane through the 
candies.
175
 She is consuming Mary Jane’s whiteness that she so desperately desires.   
   The rejection of the Breedloves and specifically, Pecola by the other members of 
the black community is rooted in the notion of colorism that exists in communities of 
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color, in which lightness of shade is equated with higher status and beauty. Colorism is a 
repetition, or internalization of an oppressive white culture. Much like Playing in the 
Dark, in The Bluest Eye, Morrison is interrogating notions of race and the sort of ego-
boost it grants to a certain few that depend on it for a sense of self, and colorism is 
another example of this phenomenon. Sheldon George writes that “race grounds fantasies 
that give access to identity.”176 Colorism can be understood as another expression of the 
fantasy notion of race instigated and maintained by the white community, as it is 
internalized by communities of color. This is demonstrated by the character Maureen 
Peal who represents a “high yellow” black girl. Everyone loves Maureen and believes her 
to be good and sweet, which makes Claudia despise her and Pecola look up to her. 
Claudia yells at Maureen, “you think you so cute!” to which Maureen replies to her, 
Pecola, and Frieda, “I am cute! And you ugly! Black and ugly…”177 The notion of 
colorism is also illustrated when a mother of a child that bullies Pecola calls her a “little 
black bitch.”178 This woman teaches her son, Junior, that is a “difference between colored 
people and niggers. They were easily identifiable.”179 This demonstrates how colorism is 
a replication of a racist white culture that gives certain individuals of color a way to feel 
more superior to the greater black community. However, one can see how this is again, 
not so much a simple relationship of victim and oppression, as those that cling to this 
notion seem to need it to establish a sense of self and identity. Copjec explains that 
“modern man, refusing to accept the finitude that modern thought thrusts upon him, 
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doubles himself through a notion of race that allows him to survive his own death,” and it 
is the avenue to immortality or eternity that race provides, this “element of ideality that is 
the source of its profound violence and its disdain for every historical obstacle, every 
contingency that opposes it.”180 
 Rejection from both the white and black community is also the source of Cholly 
Breedloves own inner struggles: his self-loathing, his drinking, and his violent temper. 
One cannot help but feel a sense of pity and empathy for this character, despite the fact 
that he sexually abuses Pecola, his own daughter. Morrison creates a complexity in his 
character that calls the reader to question “how” this inhuman abuse occurs—the cycle of 
violence and series of violent events that precede and follow the abuse—and  not 
necessarily “why” it does, as she suggests in the novel’s beginning. It is stated throughout 
the novel that Cholly’s abusive treatment of his family and his anger are forms of self-
protection so that he does not have to face the extent of his own trauma. This is why 
Morrison writes that despite the fact that Cholly hates his wife and that the two of them 
get into physical altercations frequently, he still needs her. Morrison writes that Mrs. 
Breedlove was “one of the few things abhorrent to him that he could touch and therefore 
hurt. He poured out on her the sum of all his inarticulate fury and aborted desire. Hating 
her, he could leave himself intact.”181 Cholly cannot do hurt the society that hurts him, 
but he can hurt his wife, and therefore directs his fury toward someone that is within his 
reach. Copjec clarifies that the subject’s fantasmatic sense of reality, his or her “Psychical 
reality can indefinitely defer, and thus replace, the reality of brute fact,” concluding that 
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this means that “it would be impossible to assume from the objective facts alone, how, or 
even that, the victims suffered as a consequence of their situations,” as there are a variety 
of psychic processes that function to protect the subject from pain.
182
 Cholly acts out in 
an attempt to protect himself from his own trauma, though like every other character in 
the novel, it would be too simplistic to label him as a merely a victim of trauma.  
 Just before the scene where Cholly rapes Pecola, Morrison tells the reader of a 
past traumatizing event that has shaped Cholly into the person he becomes, an event 
defined by racial and sexual violence. Morrison tells the story of Cholly’s first sexual 
experience when he was young that involved a consensual act that becomes one was he 
forced to do. This scene has been noted by scholars to be a rape scene, both 
foreshadowing and paralleling his rape of Pecola. During this scene, Cholly and his 
partner, Darlene, are outside engaging in intercourse when two white men with weapons, 
a spirit lamp, and a flashlight happen upon them. The men point their lights Cholly and 
Darlene’s direction and laugh, telling Cholly, “Get on wid it nigger,” Cholly replies, 
“Sir?,” and the one with the flashlight repeats, “I said, get on wid it. An’ make it good, 
nigger, make it good.”183 Darlene covers her face in horror, while Cholly “began to 
simulate what had gone on before,” while the men cajoled him, “Come on, coon. Faster. 
You ain’t doing nothing for her,” and snicker.184 Morrison writes that in moment, Cholly 
hated Darlene and wanted to hurt her. The omniscient narrator explains that Cholly’s 
“subconscious knew what his conscious mind did not guess—that hating them [the white 
men] would have consumed him…For now, he hated the one who had created the 
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situation, the one who bore witness to his failure, his impotence.”185 Cholly feels 
powerless to these white men and the greater racist culture, and instead, directs his hate at 
someone within his reach. Ashraf H.A. Rushdy explains that many of Morrison’s novels 
are constructed through traumatic scenes such as this, defining them as “primal scenes,” 
that are of “such significance that an individual would recollect that episode, and not 
another, at the crucial moment driven to reevaluate her or his life.”186 This traumatic 
scene must be recalled by Cholly, must be registered, and dealt with, but he pushes this 
memory away, just before he rapes Pecola. Rushdy relates that “Morrison has artfully 
delineated the pain and necessity of remembering primal scenes in each of her novels.”187 
   Rather than deal with his own trauma as it resurfaces, Cholly sexually abuses his 
daughter. Morrison writes that Cholly was “alone with his perceptions and appetites, and 
only they interested him.”188 The omniscient narrator continues to explain that Cholly did 
not have stable model of a family while he was young, and did not know how feel 
fatherly towards his children, “As it was, he reacted to them, and his reactions were based 
on what he felt at the moment.”189 When Cholly came upon Pecola alone in the kitchen 
washing dishes, “The sequence of his emotions were revulsion, guilt, pity, then love,” 
feeling disgusted and angry with how weak and defeated she looked.
190
 Pecola then 
scratched her calf with her other foot, which reminded him of when her mother, Pauline 
used to do that when we first met her. Morrison writes that in that moment, “The 
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confused mixture of his memories of Pauline and the doing of a wild and forbidden thing 
excited him.”191 This scene is written rather graphically, going into detail with the bodily 
pleasure that Cholly experienced. Morrison writes that “His soul seemed to slip down to 
his guts and fly out into her…”192 Cholly acts impulsively to satisfy his own desires 
rather than confront the sexual and racial trauma he himself has experienced. Copjec 
explains the futility of desire that consumes the subject who is “finite,” and will never be 
satisfied, “One thing comes to be substituted for another in an endless chain only because 
the subject is cut off from that essential thing that would complete it.”193 Schreiber 
explains that Cholly’s “rape of Pecola reenacts his own ‘rape,’ in his first sexual 
experience. Pecola literally absorbs his sexual trauma.”194 In pursuit of his own desire, 
Cholly continues the cycle of trauma and violence.  
 What is almost more heartbreaking and difficult to read than the rape scene itself 
is the reaction of the town when everyone finds out that Cholly impregnated Pecola and 
has taken off. A group of women gossiping discuss the event, saying, “None of them 
Breedloves are right anyhow,” that Pecola carries some of the blame for what happened 
to her, and she would be lucky if the child did not live, saying it’s “Bound to be the 
ugliest thing walking.”195 Even Claudia and Frieda abandon Pecola, though they felt very 
sad for her, Claudia noting that nobody else seemed to share their sorrow for Pecola, 
instead, people were “amused” or “shocked”.196 Pecola descends into madness, talks to 
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herself in a schizophrenic manner, believing she now has a “friend,” hallucinates, seeing 
herself with the blue eyes she has prayed for, and her baby dies. J.E. Riley et al. relates 
that “Morrison’s novel chooses not to place blame on any one individual; instead, the 
novel, in telling each character’s experiences and struggles with racism, encourages 
readers to empathize with their plights,” while also calling on to communities to “take 
care of their own, to protect one another against the ravages of cultural illnesses such as 
racism.”197 Rather than protect their own, this community seems to use the Breedloves as 
a pedestal to raise themselves up, and to make them feel better about their own lives and 
circumstances. Claudia recounts her and Frieda’s relationship with Pecola saying, “We 
were so beautiful when we stood astride her ugliness. Her simplicity decorated us, her 
guilt sanctified us, her pain made us glow with health…”198 Pecola becomes the vessel 
for the community’s own sense of lack and trauma.  
 Cathy Caruth explains that “it is the experience of waking into consciousness that, 
peculiarly, is identified with relieving trauma,” though waking up out of one’s fantasy 
reality is also a traumatic experience.
199
 Rather than individually face the rupture at the 
heart of being, and share their own experiences of trauma, the community depicted in The 
Bluest Eye chooses to instead cling to their own fantasy of reality for selfhood, and uses 
Pecola and the Breedloves to unload their own experiences of racial trauma and sense of 
lack. Claudia explains that she and Frieda, and the whole community, failed Pecola by 
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using her to feel more valuable or whole, instead of caring for her as their own.
200
 
Claudia also reflects on their barren flower bed as she did at the story’s opening. Copjec 
explains that love is a self-rupturing experience in which the subject shatters the ego, and 
gains access to a sense of selfhood. She explains that the object or individual itself is 
made lovable by the very act of loving it, stating that “love is that which renders what the 
other is loveable.”201 It is this sort of act that is needed to relieve trauma, as Caruth 
claims. This is not to say that the problems in this community could have been solved by 
overcoming psychical obstacles—the greater society that propagates the racism this 
community endures and reproduces will still exist regardless of such self-reflection. 
However, the oppressive white culture around them is also predicated on the sense of 
lack and ruptured sense of self that Copjec delineates, which provides a glimpse into how 
such social structures exist. Claudia explains that looking back on her childhood and the 
story of Pecola, “I even think now that the land of the entire country was hostile to 
marigolds that year.”202 As Morrison tells the reader at the beginning of the novel, it is 
more productive to think critically about how such violence, oppression, and trauma 
occurs, rather than ponder why, if a community is to foster an environment in which 
marigolds can grow.  
The Ruptured Subject, Lacanian Ethics, and the Story of Antigone: An Analysis of Sethe 
in Beloved  
 In Beloved, the protagonist Sethe also faces personal violence and trauma, though 
she can be interpreted as a character that is able to make a decision outside of the 
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fantasmatic realm of subjectivity and reality when she kills her baby to protect her from a 
life of slavery. In completing research for The Black Book in the early 1970’s, Morrison 
happened upon a newspaper clipping from 1865 that detailed a slave mother who killed 
her children, without remorse, to spare them the suffering she had experienced under 
slavery, and it is this historical narrative that serves as the basis for Sethe in Beloved.
203
 
Such an autonomous and self-defining action is a notion that Copjec analyzes through 
Lacan’s reading of the story of Antigone. Much of the critical scholarship of this novel, 
perhaps Morrison’s most widely read and studied work of fiction, does employ a 
Lacanian lens to analyze the character of Sethe in terms of her subjectivity and the fierce 
love she has for her children. However, much of this scholarship focuses on Sethe’s 
shortcomings as a subject, due to the trauma she experiences as a slave that she actively 
represses. Rather than analyze this aspect of Sethe’s character and the other protagonists, 
which has already been done thoroughly in scholarship about this novel, I will analyze 
Sethe’s singular act of killing her baby as a form of protection. I propose an alternative 
reading of Sethe with a different focus, one rooted in Copjec’s specific Lacanian analysis 
of subjectivity, sublimation, and ethics in Imagine There’s No Woman. Specifically, I 
would like to analyze Sethe’s act of killing her child as a way to protect her. By first 
exploring Copjec’s interrogation of Lacanian ethics based on the psychoanalytic concepts 
of desire and the death-drive, and detailing her analysis of Lacan’s reading of Antigone 
as an ethical subject, it will be possible to also understand Sethe’s act as at once self-
rupturing and ethical.  
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 Copjec grounds her work on Lacan’s notions ethics, in which he opposes 
traditional philosophical understandings of ethics and being. For Lacan, the ability to 
ethically position oneself in relation to another is only possible through acknowledging 
the Law of Desire as the motivational force that causes every individual to act in order to 
fulfill desires that are impossible to satisfy. The “lack” that is felt by every individual can 
never be contented, as it is a psychically constructed feeling of a loss of self that one 
experiences upon entering the Symbolic Order, thought, and language. For Lacan, one 
must realize the limit of desire and learn to make choices in light of the realization that 
what is desired can never be obtained. Slavoj  Žižek states that the “ultimate ethical task 
of the subject is that of the true awakening: not only from sleep, but from the spell of 
fantasy that controls us even more when we are awake.”204 Copjec explains that “the 
ethics of psychoanalysis is concerned not with the other, as is the case with so much of 
the contemporary work on ethics, but rather with the subject, who metamorphoses herself 
at the moment of encounter with the real of an unexpected event.”205 The ethical act, free 
of ideology and personal interest, is a traumatic, self-rupturing choice in which the 
subject ceases to be a subject of desire and becomes a subject of the drive. Schrieber 
connects this notion to that of “Lacan’s subject of knowledge who can move past 
culture’s gaze to create a life based on personal, rather than cultural, desire.”206 The 
ethical act takes place outside of ideology or any cultural or societal script.  
 Copjec explains the concept of the death drive to demonstrate how an ethical act 
from personal interest or ideology, is rooted in the drive, not desire—which is really the 
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Other’s desire, or desire that is dictated to the subject from her particular historical 
moment and the greater society in which she lives. Unlike desire, the drive’s goal is not 
satisfaction, and is not looking for the next outward thing so much as it is reverting back 
to the primordial state of satisfaction the subject experiences before entering the 
Symbolic Order. Copjec clarifies that “Directed not outward toward the constituted 
world, but away from it, the death drive aims at the past, at a time before the subject 
found itself where it is now, imbedded in time and moving toward death.”207 This 
primordial state is “mythical,” and re-written in psychoanalysis as the “primordial 
mother-child dyad which supposedly contained all things and every happiness to which 
the subject strives throughout his life to return.”208 This primordial state can never be 
achieved, though in reverting back to this state before the subject enters the symbolic 
order and the world of language, which cuts the subject from herself and the real, the 
drive is associated with the real, while desire is rooted in the symbolic order. This is the 
key difference between the desire and the drive: while one is predicated on the external 
world that dictates one’s desires, in which the subject moves from one object to the next, 
the drive is predicated by the real, and grants the subject access to a self-rupturing 
experience of jouissance, raising the subject out of her historical contingency. Zizek 
explains that “the consistency to which Lacan’s position hinges is thus the difference 
between reality and the Real.”209 Ethics must be rooted in the real, not in the subject’s 
fantasy of reality, or the symbolic order, thus, the ethical subject is a subject of drive, not 
desire.  
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 Sublimation is a process that operates in conjunction with the drive, and Copjec 
argues that this process is the key to understanding Antigone’s ability to love her brother 
above all else, and perform an ethical act. Copjec explains that “the death drive achieves 
its satisfaction by not achieving its aim,” as the “proper and positive activity of the drive 
is to inhibit the attainment of its aim, or in other words, it is “sublimated.”210 When the 
subject desires an object, in actuality, she desires the satisfaction the object is perceived 
to provide, not the object itself—any object will do, and the subject moves from one to 
the next, never fully satisfied. However, sublimation is a different process entirely that is 
rooted in the drive, in the real, not in the symbolic order. Copjec explains that “The point 
is that the drive does not aim beyond the ordinary object at the satisfaction to be attained 
on the other or thither side of it.”211 She continues to explain that the object the subject 
selects through the act of sublimation as part of the drive “is not a means to something 
other than itself, but is itself other than itself.”212 The subject invests the object with some 
surplus value that is not articulable through the language of the symbolic. It is the drive 
that chooses the object and divides it so that it is not what it actually is. Copjec writes that 
“There could not be a better description of drive/sublimation: it so wills what occurs that 
the object it finds is indistinguishable from the one it chooses.”213 The act of sublimation 
is the act of elevating an object to the status of a loved thing. The drive and the objects it 
selects are particular to each person, and are not rooted in ideology or the external 
world—it is a process invoking the real, not fantasy reality. This is why the drive and 
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sublimation are the key in providing an avenue for the subject to act free of historical 
contingency, ideology, or some cultural or societal script—to complete a truly 
autonomous act.   
 Lacan identifies an ethical act as a matter of personal self-rupturing, in which one 
makes a choice in a particular situation where there is no apparent choice to be made. It is 
for this reason that Lacan’s reading of the story of Antigone functions to represent her act 
of breaking the law of the state to bury her dead brother as an ethical act. As the story 
goes, Antigone tries to attain an honorable burial for her brother Polyneices, though 
Creon, the ruler, of Thebes, forbids this burial, as Polyneices is a traitor to Thebes. The 
punishment for providing a proper burial for her brother would result in her being locked 
in a tomb to die. Copjec writes that “the deed Antigone undertakes traces the path of the 
criminal drive, away from the possibilities the community prescribes and toward the 
impossible real.”214 Through Antigone’s love for her brother, she is able to perform a 
transgressive act that separates herself from the conditional characteristics of her identity 
and place in history, as well as her social community, while also exposing the void of the 
real from which the symbolic structure is predicated. Copjec explains that Antigone’s act 
is ethical in that she removes herself from the economy of desire and becomes a subject 
of the drive, due to how she “gives herself her own law and does not seek validation from 
any other authority.”215 In separating herself from the conditional basis of her identity, 
defying the ruler Creon, and asserting her love for her brother above all other 
considerations, Antigone becomes autonomous in making a decision that is not given to 
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her, constructing a different outcome for herself, and also forcing Creon to question his 
own desire and make a decision as well.  
 This is when the process of sublimation and its connection to ethics becomes 
apparent: though Antigone’s “love for her brother does not depend on any of his 
qualities, Antigone is not indifferent to them; she accepts them lovingly,” as “love is that 
which renders what the other is loveable.”216 Antigone elevates her brother to the status 
of a loved thing through the process of sublimation, is able to make a decision in which 
she sacrifices everything in order to declare her love for her brother, and guarantee his 
honorable burial. Antigone follows Lacan’s ethical command: “Do not give way to your 
desire,” by pushing beyond the limit of her desire, by risking her life to bury the brother 
she loves.
217
 Copjec reiterates that though the ethical act is never selfless, there is a clear 
difference between the perseverance of the ethical imperative and acting for personal 
gain. The contrast between Antigone in clinging to her desire, and Creon who holds fast 
to the laws of the state demonstrates the “difference between ‘acting in conformity with 
the real of desire’ and acting in a self-interested way, or acting to preserve one’s own 
continuity with oneself.”218 While Creon could receive validation or praise from others 
for following the law, and therefore has something to gain from doing so, Antigone does 
not have anything to gain from her decision, and in fact, stands to lose everything. 
Through the act of burying her brother, Antigone can no longer continue as she was 
before and sacrifices her symbolic life or identity, and place in her community, along 
with her biological death. Copjec claims that when “she covers the exposed body of her 
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brother, Antigone raises herself out of the conditions of naked existence to which Creon 
remains bound.”219 Antigone carries out an autonomous act, free of ideological basis, 
while Creon cannot break from the law and is bound to it.  
  In the same way that Antigone follows Lacan’s ethical command, “Do not give 
way on your desire,” so too can Sethe’s choice be seen to follow this subjective 
understanding. Copjec explains that “the ethics of psychoanalysis is not concerned with 
the other,” but is instead “a matter of personal conversion, of the subjective necessity of 
going beyond oneself.”220 This is why the ethical act is never a selfless act, as in the case 
of Antigone, where she did not seek validation for her action from anyone beside herself. 
Sethe explains to Paul D, an old friend of hers from “Sweet Home,” the plantation in 
which they were both enslaved, how she made the independent decision to take her 
children and run away alone. She reiterates, “It was a kind of selfishness I never knew 
nothing about before. It felt good. Good and right.”221  Sethe knew that the only way she 
would be free to love her children would be to leave the life of slavery that prohibited 
slave women from caring for and bonding with their children. Morrison writes that Paul 
D “knew exactly what she [Sethe] meant: to get to a place where you could love anything 
you choose—not to need permission for desire—well now, that was freedom.”222 Sethe’s 
decision to risk her life and those of her children to run away, and the act of killing her 
baby when she was confronted with the possibility of their return to the plantation, 
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demonstrates the kind of autonomous perseverance of following her own desire against 
all other imperatives that Lacan defines as fundamental to the ethical act. 
 Copjec reiterates that though the ethical act is never selfless, there is a clear 
difference between the perseverance of the ethical imperative and acting for personal 
gain. The contrast between Antigone in clinging to her desire, and Creon who holds fast 
to the laws of the state demonstrates the “difference between ‘acting in conformity with 
the real of desire’ and acting in a self-interested way, or acting to preserve one’s own 
continuity with oneself.”223 While Creon could receive validation or praise from others 
for following the law, and therefore has something to gain from doing so, Antigone does 
not have anything to gain from her decision, and in fact, stands to lose everything. 
Through the act of burying her brother, Antigone can no longer continue as she was 
before and sacrifices her symbolic life or identity, and place in her community, along 
with her biological death. This is an example of the sort of self-rupturing that occurs in 
the ethical act, one that Sethe’s actions also demonstrate. Morrison states that when faced 
with the possibility of her children’s return to slavery, Sethe took “every bit of life she 
had made, all the parts of her that were precious and fine and beautiful, and carried, 
pushed, dragged them through the veil, out, away, over there where no one could hurt 
them.”224 If Sethe had acted in a self-interested manner, as Copjec defines as acting to 
“preserve one’s continuity with oneself,” she would not have chosen to kill her children 
to spare them a lifetime of slavery, as in doing so, she is sacrificing her symbolic identity 
as a mother. George explains that “slavery is a blow to the slave’s fantasy of being,” 
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therefore, Sethe’s past exerpeinces in slavery have obliterated any fantastical sense of 
complete being or identity, leading her to be able to make such a self-rupturing decision 
in sacrificing her child, reaching the limit of her desire and becoming a subject of 
drive.
225
 In this way, Sethe stands to lose everything through her decision, to lose “all of 
the parts of her that were precious and fine and beautiful,” namely, her children and her 
identity as a mother. Morrison writes that “more than what Sethe did was what she 
claimed,” which scared Paul D who responded to Sethe’s story by telling her, “Your love 
is too thick.”226 Sethe responds, “Love is or it ain’t. Thin love ain’t love at all.”227 Sethe’s 
insistence on reaching the limit of her desire and sacrificing all she has in this pursuit, 
demonstrates the autonomous ethical imperative that Lacan uses the story of Antigone to 
illustrate.  
Conclusion  
 The Bluest Eye and Beloved both engage with the psychoanalytic notion of a 
subject of lack that Copjec outlines. In The Bluest Eye, Pecola, as well as the other 
characters, struggle with establishing a sense of self outside of the oppressive greater 
white culture, or master narrative. Pecola clings to the notion that if she appeared more 
“white,” the sense of lack and rejection she feels will be absolved. By the same token, 
Cholly mistreats others to repress his own sense of lack, and trauma he has yet to 
confront. Praying for blue eyes, and believing she has gained them by the story’s end, 
Pecola demonstrates how she strives for recognition in the symbolic, unable to perceive a 
different way of being. Claudia Leeb explains that “a politics of recognition, rather than 
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establishing more equal societies, makes it more difficult to understand and combat 
injustice in social and political relations.”228 However, it is not fair to delineate Pecola 
and Cholly as characters that carry grave psychological issues without first inciting the 
greater culture that is to blame for the violence, trauma, and oppression illustrated in the 
novel that they each suffer through. In Beloved, Sethe is able to reach the limit of her 
desire, rise above her historical contingency and fantasy sense of self and identity in 
transgressing all law, killing her child to save her from the life of slavery she has 
endured. Reading Sethe in light of Lacan’s reading of Antigone that Copjec employs for 
her analyses of sublimation and ethics, it is possible to offer a new reading of Sethe, as a 
character that is able to become a subject of drive, and make a completely autonomous 
decision. Copjec’s specific Lacanian lens and theorizing of the subject of lack is most 
beneficial to a reading of these two novels, while the novels themselves are able to 
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CONCLUSION  
  The definitive goal of this thesis is to explicate how the work of Agamben and 
Copjec provide potent frameworks of analyses in which to interrogate Morrison’s work, 
and demonstrate how Morrison’s work expands upon or provides explicit illustrations of 
Agamben’s theories of biopolitics and Copjec’s psychoanalytic subject of lack. Placing 
these there writers in dialogue with each other offers an avenue to rethink certain 
concepts of race, racism, and subjectivity. Throughout the process of writing this thesis, I 
have formed other questions that concern the similarities, or points of reference that 
philosophy and literature share. While it has often been written that Morrison’s work 
offers complex and powerful material for analyses using a number of critical and 
theoretical frameworks, I am now convinced that Morrison’s work offers material with 
which to better understand and perceive complex theoretical concepts, and the questions 
that are most often explored in the field of critical theory. Her work asks many of the 
same questions, and attempts to delineate them in much the same way as critical theorists 
such as Agamben and Copjec do, but as a novelist and artist, she simply uses different 
tools to conduct these quests into some of the most difficult questions concerning 
violence, oppression, and self-hood. In “Rootedness: The Ancestor as Foundation,” an 
article written by Morrison in 1984, she states her belief that literature “should be 
beautiful, and powerful, but it should also work. It should have something in it that 
enlightens; something in it that opens the door and points the way.”229  Her novels are an 
attempt to work through difficult questions of injustice and subjectivity, race and racism, 
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using art rather than abstract theoretical language in the manner of philosophers and 
critical theorists.  
 Morrison reiterates, however, that literature should have “Something in it that 
suggests what the conflicts are, what the problems are. But it need not solve those 
problems because it is not a case study, it is not a recipe.”230 Morrison’s novels reflect 
this belief, as her work attempts to analyze the “how” of violence and subjectivity in 
oppressive societal structures, though she does not attempt to provide instruction as to 
what the exact method of solving such issues are. She does, however, hint at notions of 
love, community, and collective healing that she views as detrimental to overcoming such 
conflict. Writers such as Agamben and Copjec demonstrate a similar practice, as they 
each delineate systems of injustice and division, though in abstract, theoretical 
terminology.  Though they conceptualize different ways of being, they do not provide a 
script for solving the complex issues they interrogate so much as they offer hints or 
“point the way,” as Morrison claims all literature should do. The similar projects and 
intellectual practice of writing novels and writing philosophy should be more deeply 
studied, rather than posing critical theory as merely a framework to analyze literature in 
literary studies, or using literature as an illustration of certain philosophies and theories. 
Morrison’s fiction provides convincing impetus to study the two disciplines of 
philosophy or critical theory and literature in conjunction, to further explore their 
similarities and intellectual projects as writings with related purpose.  
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